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The Practical Use of Motions to
Structure a Complex Civil Case
C. J. FARUKI*
The proper use of written motions before and at the beginning of the
trial of a complex civil action' can reduce the risk of an adverse verdict,
educate the court to the weaknesses of one's opponents, and simplify and
shorten the trial. This Article will demonstrate how written motions can be
used to structure a case so that both the risk of exposure and the chance of
surprise at trial are minimized. Part I will discuss the utility of written
pretrial motions, while Part II will focus upon the advantages of motions
filed immediately before trial and during the first few days of a lengthy
trial.
The emphasis of this Article is upon the complex civil case that will, at
least potentially, be tried to a jury. It is organized so that the issues are
discussed in the sequence they would be presented to lead counsel, namely:
(I) venue (Where should the action be tried?); (2) the proper parties to the
action (Who should be joined as a party to the action and which parties
should be dismissed?); (3) the more beneficial trier of fact (Who should
hear and decide the facts, the court or a jury?); (4) the most advantageous
point(s) to emphasize (Which claims, issues, or defenses are to be de-
cided, and in what order?); (5) proof at trial (What evidence should be
admitted?); and (6) tactics for presenting the case to the jury (How should
one educate the jury to the case?).2
What is the purpose and effect of motions directed to these issues? A
ready test for determining which issues or proof should be the subject of a
pretrial motion is to identify the subjects or evidence that will be most
harmful to one's case or that will be most difficult and expensive to
contradict, disprove, or nullify at trial. Counsel should try to eviscerate his
opponent's case by removing or weakening his opponent's strongest
arguments before these points are ever presented to the jury. The purpose
of a motion, therefore, is to structure the case in a form advantageous to
* Partner, Smith & Schnacke, Dayton, Ohio. B. A. 1971, Univ. of Cincinnati; J.D. 1973, The
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1. For purposes of this article, a complex civil action is simply one in which large amounts of
money are at stake. Examples include large contract or breach of warranty cases, antitrust actions,
securities fraud actions, civil conspiracy cases, and cases involving multiple parties and claims. A
complex civil action can be in either federal or state court, and is often tried to a jury, or at least
prepared on the assumption that it will be tried to ajury. Forabrief description of the commercial"big
case," see Gilliam, A Pragmatic Approach to Complex Litigation, 3 U. DAY. L. REv. 101, 101 (1978),
and I MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, MANUALFOR COMPLEX LITIGATION, pt. 2, 0.10, at5 (2d ed. 1979).
2. Discovery motions are not included in the scope of this Article. Motions to compel discovery
pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 37(a) and motions for a protective order under FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) are
examples. Although these and similar motions can be significant, they are widely known, routinely
used, and discussed in numerous scholarly publications. See, e.g., Note, The Emerging Deterrence
Orientation in the Imposition of Discovery Sanctions, 91 HARV. L. REV. 1033 (1978). The same
statements cannot be made about the motions discussed in this Article.
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the moving party by defining and limiting issues, discovery, and proof, and
its effect is to increase the likelihood of a favorable settlement (by shaping a
poor case for one's opponent to try) or at least to make the trial shorter,
simpler, and cheaper to conduct..
Motions directed at eliminating or structuring issues in the case
should focus the court's attention on the following factors:
3
(1) How is the jury to be instructed to handle the issue? If the jury
instructions for an issue would be unduly complex or confusing to ajury,
the court is more likely to grant a motion to limit, define, resolve, or sever
the issue.
(2) Does the issue necessitate presentation of proof different from
that required by other issues to be tried?
4
(3) Does resolution of this issue involve complex evidentiary
questions not presented by other issues to be tried? For example,
conspiracy claims in a case will probably involve the co-conspirator
exception to the hearsay rule, with all its intricacies.' Similarly, complex
expert testimony may be necessary to prove some issues but not others-
for example, experts' testimony concerning damages.
(4) Is an issue relevant to only one form of relief requested by a
party? Trial of some issues may be separated or deferred when those issues
are relevant only to certain types of relief sought by the plaintiff (e.g.,
equitable relief such as reformation, rescission, or injunction).
By directing the trial judge's attention to issues of the type mentioned
above, counsel is able to demonstrate that he recognizes the court's burden
of maintaining control over the proceedings, while, at the same time,
directing the court's efforts in a direction most likely to produce
advantageous results for his client.
I. PRELIMINARY PRETRIAL MOTIONS
A. Venue
The plaintiff who files a complex civil action will have the first chance
to choose the forum in which the case will be tried. Obviously, the choice
will not be dictated by considerations of convenience and expense to the
defendant. More importantly, the plaintiff's decision may be based on
factors that could determine the outcome of the lawsuit-for example, the
3. All written motions should be supported by sworn testimony to adequately preserve the
record. Thus, a motion should be accompanied by an affidavit of the moving party, sworn answers to
the interrogatories of either side that show relevant facts that support the motion, or excerpts of
deposition testimony relating to the issue. Counsel should avoid the use of his own affidavit except as to
the facts underlying discovery disputes or similar questions. See Garvey, The Attorney's Affidavit in
Litigation Proceedings, 31 STAN. L. Rev. 191 (1979); and King v. National Indus. Inc., 512 F.2d 29, 33-
34 (6th Cir. 1975) (holding that an affidavit of the plaintiff's attorney is insufficient to rebut an affidavit
supporting the defendant's motion for summary judgment).
4. For an example of these considerations in conspiracy cases, see the text accompanying note 71
infra.
5. See the text accompanying notes 146-52 infra.
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applicable statute of limitations in a suit brought under Rule 1Ob-5 of the
federal securities laws.6 The defendant need not, however, resign himself to
trying the action in the forum selected by the plaintiff. The federal antitrust
laws 7 and the federal securities laws8 both contain provisions that permit
an action to be venued in any one of numerous jurisdictions, and there are
several federal statutes (which the plaintiff may have overlooked) that
require an action to be brought in a specific forum or one of a limited
number of forums.9
Motions to transfer a case under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 are granted with
increasing frequency.10 A motion to transfer should be made in the
alternative, seeking first to dismiss the action for improper venue and
second, in case the court refuses to dismiss, to transfer the action to
another forum. The alternative form of motion is desirable since the court
can, if it wishes, avoid the harsh action of dismissal, and will, therefore, be
more likely to grant the relief requested.
The transfer of an action can be beneficial to the moving party in
several ways. First, the choice of forum can, in some instances, be outcome
determinative." The importance of selecting the proper courts in a rule
6. 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1978). Although securities actions are governed by federal law, the
period in which an action must be brought is a matter of state law.
Courts have reached different results in determining which statute of limitations to apply. The
Sixth Circuit, for example, has specifically rejected the two year statute of limitations provided in the
Ohio Blue Sky law, choosing to apply Ohio's four year fraud statute of limitations for actions brought
in a federal district court in Ohio. Gaudin v. KDI Corp., 576 F.2d 708,711-12 (6th Cir. 1978); Nickels v.
Koehler Management Corp., 541 F.2d 611 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1074 (1977). On the
other hand, the Tenth Circuit has choosen a two year statute of limitations for actions in which
Oklahoma law governs. Dzenits v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168, 171
(10th Cir. 1974). See generally Jacobs, Affirmative Defenses to Securities Exchange Act Rule lOb-5
Actions, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 857, 860-69 (1976).
Some circuits also have more stringent standards of proof for fraudulent concealment, which is a
question of federal rather than state law. Compare In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d
1148, 1170-71 (5th Cir. 1979) (defendant must prove that plaintiff knew or should have known that
cause of action existed), and Dayco Corp. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 523 F.2d 389,394 (6th Cir.
1975) (plaintiffmust prove that defendant concealed the wrong, and that he remained ignorant through
no fault of his own); with Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank of Lincolnwood, 509 F.2d 1287, 1297 (7th Cir.
1975) (plaintiff must prove wrongful concealment by defendant, his failure to discover within the
statutory period, and his own due diligence).
7. 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1976). See also Ballard v. Blue Shield of S.W. Va., Inc., 543 F.2d 1075, 1080
(4th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 922 (1977).
8. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77a, 78aa (1976). See also Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 99 S.Ct. 1494 (1979);
International Controls Corp. v. Vesco, 490 F.2d 1334 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 417 U.S. 932 (1974).
9. For example, patent infringement actions are governed by 28 U.S.C. § 1400(b), which
provides as follows: "Any civil action for patent infringement may be brought in the judicial district
where the defendant resides, or where the defendant has committed acts of infringement and has a
regular and established place of business." This statute is exclusive and cannot be supplemented by any
other venue statute. Fourco Glass Co. v. Transmirra Prod. Corp., 353 U.S. 222 (1957).
10. The leading cases are Continental Grain Co. v. Barge FBL-585, 364 U.S. 19,26 (1960); Gulf
Oil Corp. v. Gilbert, 330 U.S. 501, 508 (1947); Skil Corp. v. Millers Falls Co., 541 F.2d 554 (6th Cir.
1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976); Chicago, R.I. & P.R. Co. v. Igoe, 212 F.2d 378,382 (7th Cir.
1954), appeal after remand, 220 F.2d 299, 304 (7th Cir. 1955), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 822 (1955).
Mandamus is the proper procedure for challenging the propriety of a transfer pursuant to 28 U.S.C.
§ 1404(a). Caleshu v. Wangelin, 549 F.2d 93, 96 (8th Cir. 1977); Skil Corp. v. Millers Falls Co., 541
F.2d 554. 557 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1029 (1976).
11. Change of venue may not always change the applicable law. In VanDusen v. Barrack, 376
U.S. 612 (1964), a diversity action, the Supreme Court pointed out that "[t]he decisions of the lower
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lOb-5 action has already been mentioned, 2 and the varying tests used to
determine standing to sue under the antitrust laws 13 have also made the
selection of the forum an important factor in antitrust actions. Second,
because the number of pending cases, the number of judges, and the effect
of criminal "speedy trial" acts vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction,
counsel may be able to advance or postpone the trial date (within limits) by
having the case transferred to a different forum. Since the timing of
lawsuits can often be critical, transfer to another forum may confer a
substantial tactical advantage. Finally, a defendant may be able to
decrease the cost and annoyance of trying the action by transferring it to a
more convenient forum. Convenience, without more, will frequently
warrant a motion to change venue, and counsel should not ignore the
advantages of trying the case in a local forum when assessing the merits of a
marginally advantageous motion.
B. The Proper Parties
At an early stage of the litigation, the defendant should determine if
the proper parties (from his standpoint) are before the court. This question
can be raised by a motion challenging standing, 4 the real party in
federal courts, taken as a whole, reveal that courts construing § 1404(a) have been strongly inclined to
protect plaintiffs against the risk that transfer might be accompanied by a prejudicial change in
applicable state laws." Id. at 630 (emphasis added). The Court went on to hold that "the transferee
district court must be obligated to apply thestate law that would have been applied if there had been no
change of venue . I.." "d  at 639 (emphasis added). See also Headrick v. Atchison T. & S.F. Ry. Co.,
182 F.2d 305 (10th Cir. 1950) (holding that an action originally brought in a New Mexico state court,
removed to a New Mexico federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and finally transferred to a California
district court would still be governed by New Mexico law).
The scope of VanDusen is unclear, however, since jurisdiction was based upon diversity of
citizenship and different choice of laws rules apply in diversity actions. See Walko Corp. v. Burger Chef
Systems, Inc., 554 F.2d 1165, 1167-71 (D.C. Cir. 1977). There are few cases that discuss the effect of
transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404 (a) when the claim is based on federal law. In re Pittsburgh & Lake Erie
R.R. Co. Sec. & Antitrust Litigation, 543 F.2d 1058 (3d Cir. 1976), is indicative of the cases that do
raise this issue:
All of these opinions assumed that the rule of Van Dusen v. Barrack, supra, determines the
interpretation of federal law which the transferor district would apply. It is difficult to
understand why this should be so since Van Dusen v. Barrack involved conflicting state
wrongful death policies, while, in theory at least, federal law, in its area of competence, is
assumed to be nationally uniform, whether or not it is in fact.
Id. at 1065 n.19 (emphasis in original). See also DeMateos v. Texaco, Inc., 562 F.2d 895, 899 (3d Cir.
1977). Since federal courts frequently refuse to apply state laws when doing so would frustrate the
enforcement of a federal statute, see, e.g., In re Pittsburgh & Lake Erie R.R. Co. Sec. & Antitrust
Litigation, 543 F.2d 1058, 1065-67 (3d Cir. 1976); Drachman v. Harvey, 453 F.2d 722 (2d Cir. 1972)
(securities action), a transfer under 28 U.S.C. § 1404(a) may well be outcome determinative when two
courts of appeals have interpreted a federal statute differently.
12. See note 6 and accompanying text supra.
13. Compare Costner v. Blount Nat'l Bank of Maryville, Tenn., [1978-I) Trade Cas. 62,115
(6th Cir. 1978), and Malamud v. Sinclair Oil Corp., 521 F.2d 1142 (6th Cir. 1975), with Karseal Corp. v.
Richfield Oil Corp., 221 F.2d 358, 362-64 (9th Cir. 1955) (the "target area" test). See also In re
Multidistrict Vehicle Air Polution M.D.L. No. 31, 481 F.2d 122, 126-29 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 414
U.S. 1045 (1973) (comparing the Ninth Circuit's target area approach with the"direct injury" approach
of some other circuits). A particularly good discussion of standing under the antitrust laws can be
found in Shapiro v. General Motors Corp., [1979-2] Trade Cas. 62,725 (D. Md. 1979), and Fincher v.
American Airlines, Inc., [1979-I] Trade Cas. T 62,590 (S.D.N.Y. 1979).
14. Both Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug Stores,421 U.S. 723 (1975), and Piper v. Chris-Craft
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interest, 5 or personal jurisdiction. 16 The defendant should also consider
whether the named plaintiffs and defendants are suitable representatives
when the action is brought on behalf of a corporation 7 or as a class
action, 8 and the effect of the assignment of a contract, a corporate merger
or acquisition, or a parent-subsidiary relationship on the plaintiff's ability
to bring the suit.' 9 Finally, the possibility that diversity jurisdiction 0 or
venue 1 could be destroyed by joining additional parties (forcing the
plaintiffto refile his action in a forum more advantageous to the defendant)
should be considered.
C. The More Beneficial Trier of Fact
A motion to strike a demand for a jury trial on the ground that the
action is too complex for ajury (that is, that the trial of the action is beyond
the practical abilities and limitations of a jury) can be another method of
structuring an action to one's advantage-if the action presents facts
22
sufficient to support such a motion. Counsel may also want to choose the
Indus., Inc., 430 U.S. 1 (1977), restricted standing under the federal securities laws. Standing under the
antitrust laws is discussed in note 13 supra. See also AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANTITRUST LAW
DEVELOPMENTS 257-70 (1975); Berger, An Analytic Framework for Antitrust Standing, 86 YALE L.J.
809 (1977); Crane Co. v. American Standard, Inc., 603 F.2d 244 (2d Cir. 1979).
15. FED. R. Civ. P. 17(a). See also Sell v. Volkswagen of America, Inc., 505 F.2d 953 (6th Cir.
1974); Virginia Elec. & Power Co. v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 485 F.2d 78 (4th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 415 U.S. 935 (1974).
16. Recent cases have restricted long-arm jurisdiction to some extent. Kulko v. Superior Court,
436 U.S. 84 (1978); Shaffer v. Heitner, 433 U.S. 186 (1977). See also Weller v. Cromwell Oil
Co., 504 F.2d 927 (6th Cir. 1974) (affirming a lower court's decision to quash service of process and
holding that jurisdiction over a corporation does not, by itself, confer jurisdiction over individual
corporate officers).
17. In the Matter of Bowen Transports, Inc., 551 F.2d 171 (7th Cir. 1977) (refusing to pierce the
corporate veil); Kauffman v. Dreyfus Fund, Inc., 434 F.2d 727, 732 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 974 (1971) (mutual fund shareholder); cases collected in AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION, ANTITRUST
LAW DEVELOPMENTs 259 (1975).
18. See FED. R. Civ. P. 23. See also Susman v. Lincoln Am. Corp., 561 F.2d 86 (7th Cir. 1977)
(plaintiffs were not adequate class representatives when they were a relative or partner of counsel for
plaintiff); Turoffv. May Co., 531 F.2d 1357, 1360 (6th Cir. 1976) (court found conflict of interest when
plaintiffs were the three attorneys for plaintiffs and one of the attorney's wife since plaintiffs' interest
was recovering a substantial fee rather than maximizing the return for class members); Note,
Developments in the Law-Class Actions, 89 HARV. L. REV. 1318, 1454-98 (1976).
19. See, e.g., Sherman v. British Leyland Motors, Ltd., [1979-2] Trade Cas. 62,784 (9th Cir.
1979); Boggs v. Blue Diamond Coal Co., 590 F.2d 655 (6th Cir. 1979) (parent corporation not liable for
subsidiary's negligence under doctrine ofrespondeat superior); United States v. Michigan Carton Co.,
552 F.2d 198, 200-01 (7th Cir. 1977) (criminal antitrust action).
20. Diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (1976) requires complete diversity, i.e., none
of the plaintiffs may reside in the same state as any of the defendants. Strawbridge v. Curtiss, 7 U.S. (3
Cranch) 267 (1806). See also Owen Equip. & Erection Co. v. Kroger, 437 U.S. 365,373-74, 377 (1978).
Problems of manipulation of citizenship status, collusion to create or defeat federal diversity
jurisdiction, and realignment of parties as plaintiffs ordefendants are summarized in Rowe, Abolishing
Diversity Jurisdiction: Positive Side Effects and Potentialfor Further Reforms, 92 HARV. L. REV. 963,
969-79 (1979).
21. In an action based on federal question jurisdiction, 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1976), the joinder of a
defendant who resides in a district different from the district of the other defendant's residence would
mean that the action must be brought in the district "in which the claim arose." 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b)
(1976). See Leroy v. Great W. United Corp., 99 S. Ct. 1494 (1979).
22. See generally Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex CivilLitigation, 92 HARV. L. REV.
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opposite course, either requesting a jury in the initial pleading or "not later
than ten days after the service of the last pleading directed to the issue"
triable by the jury,23 or requesting the court in its discretion to empanel a
jury.
24
Another possibility that should be considered is a request that the
court submit interrogatories to the jury.25 The use of interrogatories, as
compared to a special verdict,26 requires the jury to reach a general verdict
as well as answering specific questions concerning its findings. A trial court
is under no duty to use jury interrogatories, but a refusal may be reviewed
for abuse of discretion. 27 Well-drafted interrogatories 2 will reveal the
basis (or lack thereof) of the jury's decision and may also cause the jury to
consider the factual issues more carefully. For example, if the action
requests both damages and equitable relief, a party may want to use
interrogatories to establish that the jury granted one form of relief as a
898 (1979). See also Rutledgev. Electric Hose & Rubber Co., 511 F.2d 668,675 (9th Cir. 1975) (no error
in denial of jury in view of the complexity of the anticipated issues); Zenith Radio Corp. v. Matsushita
Elec. Indus. Co., [1979-2] Trade Cas. 62,753 (E.D. Pa. 1979) (denying defendant's motion to strike a
jury demand in a complex antitrust action holding that a court cannot consider the practical abilities
and limitations of jurors); In re United States Financial Sec. Litigation, [1978] SEC. L. REP. (CCH)
96,301 (S.D. Cal. 1977) (jury demands stricken when trial expected to last two years, there were 18
consolidated suits, and the parties and the legal theories were interrelated); In re Boise Cascade Sec.
Litigation, 420 F. Supp. 99 (W.D. Wash. 1976) (granting motion to strikejury demand); Tomac, Inc. v.
Coca-Cola Co., 418 F. Supp. 359 (C.D. Cal. 1976). The Zenith Court certified its decision for
immediate appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) (1976), indicating that "the question certified is one of the
raging questions in the law today." [1979-2] Trade Cas. 62,753, at 79,171.
23. FED. R. Civ. P. 38(b).
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 39(b). Cf. 1 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION
pt. 2, 2.60, at 115-16 (2d ed. 1979) (use of advisory juries under FED. R. Civ P. 39 (c) & 48). See also
VA. CODE § 8.01-336(E) (1978) (discretionary use of a jury in an equity action); Dull v. Dull, 140 Va.
370, 381, 125 S.E. 142, 145 (1924); and Catron v. Norton Hardware Co., 123 Va. 380, 96 S.E. 853
(1918), all interpreting that statute.
25. FED. R. Civ. P. 49(b). See also Spectrofuge Corp. v. Beckman Instruments, Inc., 575 F.2d
256, 258 (5th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1289 (1979); Jamison Co. v. Westvaco Corp., 526 F.2d
922, 935 (5th Cir. 1976).
26. FED. R. Civ. P. 49 (a). The seminal authority in this area is Brown, Federal Special Verdicts:
The Doubt Eliminator, 44 F.R.D. 338 (1967).
27. It is a duty of the trial court to see that proper forms of verdict are provided to thejury. Scott
v. Isbrandtsen Co., 327 F.2d 113, 121 (4th Cir. 1964). The possibility of obtaining a reversal onappeal
was discussed in Great Costal Express, Inc. v. International Bhd. of Teamsters, 511 F.2d 839 (4th
Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 975 (1976):
[W]e . . . note that there apparently has never been a reversal for abuse of discretion in
determining the form of verdict. We hold, with Toth v. Corning Glass Works, 411 F.2d 912,
914 n.2 (6th Cir. 1969), that where the complaining party made no request for a special verdict
to the trial court, it cannot raise the issue for the first time on appeal.
511 F.2d at 845 (citation omitted). The court's comment concerning special verdicts applies with equal
force to requests for jury interrogatories: "In a complicated case such as this, the special interrogatory
device localizes and focalizes the specific problems and issues whereas a general verdict often permits
improper jury meandering at trial and presents impossible matching efforts on appeal." Jamison Co. v.
Westvaco Corp., 526 F.2d 922, 935 (5th Cir. 1976).
28. Interrogatories to the jury that were actually used in complex cases are quoted in General
Beverage Sales Co. v. East-Side Winery, [1978-1] Trade Cas. 61,815 at 73,395-96 (7th Cir. 1978)
(antitrust and contract); Heatransfer Corp. v. Volkswagenverk, A.G., 553 F.2d 964,969 n. 1 (5th Cir.
1977, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1087 (1978) (antitrust action); Contemporary Mission, Inc. v. Famous
Music Corp., 557 F.2d 918, 922 (2d Cir. 1977) (contract action); Martin B. Glauser Dodge Co. v.
Chrysler Corp., 570 F.2d 72, 80 (3d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 913 (1978) (antitrust action);
Coleman Motor Co. v. Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338, 1340 (3d Cir. 1975) (antitrust action).
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compromise, although the facts supported an award of both (or neither)
damages and equitable relief. Counsel should remember, however, that a
jury may be confused by unduly complex interrogatories, 29 and that
careful drafting is an indispensable part of their use.30
In assessing whether a case should be tried to a jury or to the bench,
counsel should consider the complexity of the action, the length and
subject of the trial, the possibilities of confusion and prejudice, and the fact
that it is more difficult to secure a reversal for the admission of inadmissible
evidence when the action is tried to the court.31 As an alternative, a party
might ask the trial court to adopt innovative methods of determining fact,
using the existing literature32 to inform the court of the difficulties that
frequently accompany the use of juries in complex civil actions.33 These
innovations might include permitting jurors to take notes,34 to ask
questions, 35 or to use "jury books" of exhibits. 36
D. The Points on Which the Case Should Turn
Another question is: What claims, issues, or defenses should be
decided, and in what order? Complex cases may often be resolved on more
than one ground, and many times the selection of issues and the order in
which they will be tried will determine which party emerges from the
courtroom with a judgment in his favor. Two procedures are particularly
29. "Double questions, or questions in the alternative, should be avoided." Scarborough v.
Atlantic Coast Line R. Co., 190 F.2d 935,938 (4th Cir. 1951). "It is true that if an issue is framed inan
alternative which proposes different or inconsistent theories, and the answer of the jury is a simple yes
or no, the verdict may be so ambiguous that it will not support ajudgment." Seaboard Air Line R.R.
Co. v. Gill, 227 F.2d 64, 66 (4th Cir. 1955).
30. Scott v. Isbrandtsen Co., Inc., 327 F.2d 113, 119 (4th Cir. 1964) held that "the form of the
special issues should be such as not to mislead or confuse the jury." The interrogatories should be in
question form and questions of damage should always be separated from questions of liability.
Cunningham v. M-G Transp. Servs., Inc., 527 F.2d 760,761-62 (4th Cir. 1975). The factors to be used
to determine the adequacy of the special interrogatories are listed in Tights, Inc. v. Acme McCrary,
Corp., 541 F.2d 1047, 1060 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 980 (1976) (patent infringement action),
and Dreiling v. General Elec. Co., 511 F.2d 768, 774 (5th Cir. 1975) (products liability action).
31. Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. Global Moving& Storage, Inc., 531 F.2d 320,324 (6th Cir.
1976).
32. Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex Civil Litigation, 92 HARV. L. REV. 898 (1979).
33. Examples of possible innovations are listed in Note, The Right to a Jury Trial in Complex
Civil Litigation, 92 HARv. L. REV. 898, 915 (1979); Note, Developments in Law-Criminal
Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L. REv. 920, 981 (1959).
34. See text accompanying notes 192, 193 infra.
35. The best way to handle questions by jurors is for the juror to ask his question of the trial
judge, who then puts the question (in acceptable form for purposes of the rules of evidence) to the
witness, or tells the juror that the question cannot be asked for evidentiary reasons. No error should
result if this approach is used.
36. This author and one of his partners have used "jury books" in the trial of complex antitrust,
breach of contract, and breach of warranty actions in federal district courts in Ohio, Virginia, and
California. A jury book is a notebook of selected trial exhibits to be used by the party preparing the
book during a particular day's direct or cross-examination. Eachjuror has ajury book containing from
one to fifty trial exhibits. The exhibits are tabbed and at the beginning of a question about a document
the jury is told to turn to a particular tab to find that document. This procedure enables the jurors to
follow along and to retain the testimony better than they could without such a device. It is also faster
than passing a single exhibit or a series of exhibits among the jurors.
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useful for shaping the issues to be tried, the motion for summary judgment
and the motion for an early, separate trial of a claim, issue, or defense.
1. Summary Judgment
Even when unsuccessful, a motion for summary judgment often
serves the purpose of forcing an opponent to reveal parts of his case he
has avoided disclosing during discovery. More importantly, however,
summary judgment may completely dispose of an issue.37
A motion for summary judgment is appropriate if the matter in issue
presents only questions of law.3" Appellate courts have traditionally
applied strict standards when reviewing lower court decisions that grant
summary judgment,39 but the fact remains that a trial court must grant a
motion for summary judgment if it raises "no genuine issue of material
fact.,,40 The entry of summary judgment does not require that there be no
issues of fact, only that there be no issues ofmaterialfact,41 and a party can
always argue that the factual questions raised by his opponent are
immaterial given the governing law.42
Summary judgment motions are particularly useful in contract
actions. The interpretation of a contract is a question for the court, and
may appropriately be resolved on a motion for summary judgment.43 The
motion will probably not raise questions of fact since, at least when a
contract is unambiguous on its face, the parol evidence rule precludes the
admission of extrinsic evidence.44 A liquidated damages clause could also
37. General comments concerning the use of a motion for summary judgment can be found in
Louis, Federal Summary Judgment Doctrine: A Critical Analysis, 83 YALE L.J. 745 (1974); Currie,
Thoughts on Directed Verdicts and Summary Judgments, 45 U. CH. L. REv. 72 (1977). Since
summary judgment motions are adequately discussed in these and other articles, the discussion in this
article will be limited to the use of summary judgment motions as a tool for structuring complex civil
actions.
38. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
39. A leading case on this point is S. J. Groves & Sons Co. v. Ohio Turnpike Comm'n,315 F.2d
235, 237 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 824 (1963). See also Charbonnages de France v. Smith, 597
F.2d 406,414 (4th Cir. 1979); United States v. Lowell, 557 F.2d 70,72 (6th Cir. 1977); Arnold Palmer
Golf Co. v. Fuqua Indus., Inc., 541 F.2d 584, 588 (6th Cir. 1976); Board of Educ. v. Department of
HEW, 532 F.2d 1070, 1071 (6th Cir. 1976); Gould v. American-Hawaiian S.S. Co., 535 F.2d 761,771
(3d Cir. 1976).
40. FED. R. Civ. P. 56.
41. Id.
42. In this sense the motion for summary judgment meets the traditional standard for a motion
to dismiss set forth in Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41,45-46 (1957), and followed in Scheuerv. Rhodes,
416 U.S. 232, 236 (1974), and numerous lower court cases, see, e.g., Smart v. Ellis Trucking Co. 580
F.2d 215, 218 n.3 (6th Cir. 1978); Ott v. Midland-Ross Corp., 523 F.2d 1367, 1369 (6th Cir. 1975).
Conley was quoted with approval in Hospital Bldg. Co. v. Trustees of Rex Hosp., 425 U.S. 738,746
(1976), an antitrust action which held that motions to dismiss should rarely be granted in antitrust
cases, in which proof may be in the hands of conspirators, before ample discovery is allowed.
43. Local 783 Allied Indus. Workers v. General Elec. Co.,471 F.2d 751,757 (6th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 822 (1975). For an example of a successful summary judgment motion based on this
argument, see Ralli-Coney, Inc. v. Gates, 528 F.2d 572, 574 (5th Cir. 1976) (holding that partial
summary judgment on the issue of liability was properly granted when the contract was unambiguous
and the parol evidence rule did not permit introduction of oral testimony).
44. Industrial Equip. Co. v. Emerson Elec. Co., 554 F.2d 276, 284 (6th Cir. 1977); Robin v. Sun
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be the basis for deciding a case on a motion for summary judgment, since,
absent an allegation of fraud, a liquidation clause makes it very difficult to
raise material issues concerning damages. 45 Finally, a motion for summary
judgment may be an extremely beneficial means of arguing the effect of an
"integration clause" or "merger clause." These clauses, which provide that
the written contract is the sole and exclusive agreement of the parties,46 are
frequently used in modern franchise and other major agreements. A
summary judgment motion 47 permits a party to use an integration clause
offensively-to carve out a key portion of the opponent's case48-rather
than as a shield-for example, in support of an objection to the testimony
of a witness-behind which to hide at trial.
A defendant can use a summary judgment motion most effectively
when he seeks to establish one or more defenses raised in his answer.49
Early discovery directed at establishing the facts necessary to support one
or more defenses and a promptly filed motion for summary judgment is the
best way for a defendant to counter his opponent. This course of action
puts the plaintiff on the defensive and can, if vigorously pressed, cause the
plaintiff to lose the initiative.
A particularly devastating tactic is to file a motion for partial
summary judgment directed at all the issues of opponent's case that can be
decided on legal or narrow factual grounds.50 A successful motion for
Oil Co., 548 F.2d 554, 557 (5th Cir. 1976); EAC Credit Corp. v. King, 507 F.2d 1232, 1241 (5th Cir.
1975); Local 783 Allied Indus. Workers v. General Elec. Co., 471 F.2d 751, 757 (6th Cir. 1973), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 822 (1973); Pavlik v. Consolidation Coal Co., 456 F.2d 378 (6th Cir. 1972). The trend
toward a more liberal interpretation of the parol evidence rule may temper the effectiveness of this
tactic. See 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS § 579 (1960 & Supp. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS
§ 240 (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7, 1973).
45. A trial court's entry of partial summary judgment based upon a liquidated damages
provision was affirmed in Worthington Corp. v. Consolidated Aluminum Corp., 544 F.2d 227,234-35
(5th Cir. 1976).
46. See U.C.C. § 2-202(b) (1977). See also Franz Chem. Corp. v. Philadelphia Quartz Co., 594
F.2d 146, 149 (5th Cir. 1979) (interpreting a typical merger clause).
47. A summary judgment motion based upon an integration clause seldom raises factual
questions. The court must determine that the clause is ambiguous before testimony concerning the
meaning of the clause or the intention of the parties is relevant, and integration clauses are seldom
drafted in any but the clearest language. See Golden Gate Acceptance Corp. v. General Motors Corp.,
597 F.2d 676, 680 (9th Cir. 1979) ("because we find the Agreement to be unambiguous in regards to the
provisions involved herein, we may not resort to alleged antecedent understandings or parol evidence
to create a genuine issue of fact as to the meaning of those provisions"). Cf. 3 CORBIN ON CONTRACTS
§ 579 (1960 & Supp. 1971); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 240 (Tent. Draft Nos. 1-7, 1973).
48. Lee v. Flintkote Co., 593 F.2d 1275, 1277 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1979), affirmed a grant of summary
judgment for the defendant in an action for intentional interference by a third party with contractual
relations, in which the franchise agreements contained a merger clause and no ambiguity in the
contract was found. Accord, Golden Gate Acceptance Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 597 F.2d 676,
680 (9th Cir. 1979) (automobile dealership agreement).
49. Statute of limitations defenses are a particularly good example. But see Dzenits v. Merrill
Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 494 F.2d 168, 171 (10th Cir. 1974) ("While cases involving
defenses hinging upon applicable statutes of limitation frequently lend themselves to summary
judgment proceedings, a court should not grant summary judgment for a defendant if there is a viable
issue of fact as to when the limitations period began.").
50. The author has met with mixed success in using motions for partial summary judgment to
determine issues raised by a defense. In State v. Klosterman French Baking Co., [1977-I] Trade Cas.
61,361 (S.D. Ohio 1976), a partial summary judgment motion based on an allegation of laches was
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partial summary judgment can narrow the scope of discovery yet to be
conducted, increase the chances for a favorable settlement, and remove
trivial issues from contention, permitting the jury to focus on the more
complex and difficult issues of fact. Moreover, counsel for the opposing
party can resist a summary judgment motion effectively only by describing
his case, his view of the issues, and his expected proof. A motion for
summary judgment or partial summary judgment therefore carries the
added benefits of forcing the opponent to reveal his case, of preventing any
surprise at trial, and of producing a response that will almost surely
contain admissions and inconsistent statements that can be used against
the opponent in further discovery proceedings, other motions, and a trial
brief. The reply will also, in many cases, reveal the gaps in one's discovery
and point out any additional steps that may be necessary to prepare
adequately for trial.
A motion for partial summary judgment should always be
accompanied by a request for a statement, pursuant to Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(b), that the court is directing the entry of final judgment
and that there is no reason for delaying an appeal. A suggested form of
order, which includes this certification, should be attached to the motion as
an exhibit. The effect of this procedure will be (1) to obtain final disposition
of the claims at issue, thereby preventing the court from later changing its
mind, and (2) to force one's opponent to appeal the entry of partial
summary judgment immediately if he wishes to keep that issue alive,
forcing him to litigate part of his case in the court of appeals and part in the
trial court.
2. Separate Trials
Another type of motion that is seldom used, but that can be used to
great advantage, saving the parties' and the court's time and money, is the
motion for a separate trial of certain claims or issues. The most common
method of separating issues in a complex civil case is the bifurcated trial, in
denied when the court determined that the four year statute of limitations provided by the Clayton Act,
15 U.S.C. § 15b (1976), did not preempt an Ohio statute that included no statute of limitations. On the
other hand, a motion for partial summary judgment was successful in Federal Property Management
Corp. v. Harris, 448 F. Supp. 560 (S.D. Ohio 1978), rev'd on other grounds, 603 F.2d 1226 (6th Cir.
1979).
51. "Rule 54(b) is designed to permit appeals from partial judgments when one or more, but less
than all claims are decided." Saalfrank v. O'Daniel, 533 F.2d 325, 330 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 922 (1976). See also Kirtland v. J. Ray McDermott & Co., 568 F.2d 1166, 1168-69 (5th Cir. 1978)
(collecting cases); William B. Tanner Co. v. United States, 575 F.2d 101, 102 (6th Cir. 1978). Counsel
opposing the appeal can, of course, contest certification under Rule 54(b) on appeal, either because the
order is not a final determination of one or more issues or because the trialcourt abused its discretion in
certifying the order under Rule 54(b). See Brunswick Corp. v. Sheridan, 582 F.2d 175, 182-85 (2d Cir.
1978) (holding that the trial court abused its discretion by including a Rule 54 (b) certification in its
order dismissing a counter-claim based on the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1976), since the defense
that the contract sued upon violated the antitrust laws, was unenforceable, and inextricably
interrelated to the counterclaim); Schaefer v. First Nat'l Bank of Lincolnwood, 465 F.2d 234,235 (7th
Cir. 1972) ("There is no question that this court may review the propriety of the granting by the district
court of the plaintiffs motion for a Rule 54(b) determination.").
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which liability issues are tried first and damage issues, which often involve
complex expert testimony, are reserved for a separate trial.12 The trial of
the damages issues can even be postponed until an appeal from the entry of
judgment on liability is decided. 3 Of course, in some cases, for example
antitrust actions, a proposal for a bifurcated trial would be subject to the
objection that injury (the fact of damage as opposed to the amount of
damage) is an element of the plaintiff's case 4 Moreover, although the
bifurcated trial has much to recommend it,55 counsel may sometimes
wish to try both liability and damages issues to the same jury.
The use of a motion for a separate trial of a single claim, issue, or
defense can save even more time and money than the bifurcated trial. Even
the liability phase of a complex civil action can be quite lengthy, and the
use of the motion for separate trial offers the court the tempting
opportunity to resolve (or, at least, possibly to resolve) a complex case in a
two or three day trial of a single issue rather than in a multi-week trial of all
the issues. As one court has noted: "From the standpoint of both the court
and the parties, it is better to fight the battle which might win the war, than
to by-pass the battle and fight the whole war as a means for determining
whether, in the first instance, the battle should have been fought.
56
Moreover, as other courts have pointed out, complex civil actions are
sometimes too much for a jury to consider in one sitting:
To expect a jury to assimilate the economic and historical condition of an
entire industry, keeping separate the conspiracy claims from the non-
conspiracy claims, bearing in mind the relevant markets for myriad products
at different points in time, and to understand what would inevitably be an
enormously complex charge at the end of trial is to expect too much. In our
view, such a trial would carry with it an inherent likelihood of prejudice.5 7
Despite the advantages, however, courts have been reluctant to grant
separate trials, mainly because the trial of individual issues encourages
fragmented litigation.58
52. In re Master Key Antitrust Litigation, 528 F.2d 5, 14 (2d Cir. 1975); Warner v. Rossignol,
513 F.2d 678,684 (1st Cir. 1975); Cale v. Outboard Marine Corp., 48 F.R.D. 328,329 (E.D. Wis. 1969).
53. This procedure was utilized in Phillips v. Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp., 426 F. Supp. 1156
(D. Md. 1977), on appeal, [1979-2] Trade Cas. 62,743 (4th Cir. 1979).
54. See C.W. Regan, Inc. v. Parsons Brinckerhoff, Quade & Douglas, 411 F.2d 1379 (4th Cir.
1969) (separate trials on liability and damages should not have been held because that procedure
eliminated evaluation of amount of damages resulting from conduct of plaintiffand from conduct of
other contractor). Recovery under the Sherman and Clayton Acts is available only "where actual
injury has been suffered." Gray v. Shell Oil Co., 469 F.2d 742,749 (9th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 412 U.S.
943 (1973). See also Pacific Coast Agric. Export Ass'n v. Sunkist Growers, Inc., 526 F.2d 1196, 1205
(9th Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 959 (1976).
55. 1 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION pt. 2, 4.12, at 167 (2d
ed. 1979).
56. Seven-Up Co. v. O-So Grape Co., 177 F. Supp. 91, 100-01 (S.D. Ill. 1959) (granting a motion
for separate trial of the defense of laches in advance of the trial of other issues in a complicated
trademark infringement action).
57. Reading Indus., Inc. v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 61 F.R.D. 662, 665 (S.D.N.Y. 1974).
58. See, e.g., Molinaro v. Watkins-Johnson CEI Division, 60 F.R.D. 410,413 (D. Md. 1973) (a
patent infringement action).
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The power to grant a separate trial on one or more issues is
discretionary.59 In determining whether to grant a request, courts will
typically consider a number of factors, including (1) whether a separate
trial would avoid prejudice, (2) whether one or more claims or defenses
present factual and legal questions that differ significantly from the
remainder of the case, (3) whether a single trial of all the claims would be
intolerably complicated, and (4) whether a separate trial of one or a limited
number of issues might dispose of the entire case.60 Thus, for example, the
courts have granted separate trials of counterclaims that seek both
rescission and damages, 1 of antitrust claims when they are joined in a
contract action,62 of separate agency issues that could resolve the entire
case,63 and, in a products liability action, of"a substantial issue of material
fact which, if resolved in defendant's favor, would exonerate defendant
from liability. 64
Of course, some cases are more susceptible to disposition via a
separate trial than are others. The affirmative defense of release, for
example, provides an excellent opportunity for a separate trial, since "the
effect of release upon co-conspirators shall be determined in accordance
with the intentions of the parties. ' '65 A brief trial of this issue in an action
brought after the defendant's co-conspirators have settled with the plaintiff
could resolve the case with a minimum of expenditure of time and money.
Indeed, this defense is one of the issues that the Manual for Complex
Litigation recommends for separate trial.66 Virtually any of the affirmative
defenses listed in Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(c) can be made the
basis of a motion for summary judgment or a motion for a separate trial of
61
an issue.
Another possible use for a motion for an early, separate trial would be
to separate conspiracy claims from breach of contract claims or other tort
claims. The motion would be based upon the idea that "[t]he tort of
'conspiracy' is poorly defined, and highly susceptible to judicial
expansion., 68 Numerous issues can be presented by conspiracy claims that
59. FED. R. Civ. P. 42; OHIO R. Civ. P. 42(B); VA. CODE § 8.01-272 (1978).
60. See generally Note, Separate Trial ofa Claim or Issue in Modern Pleading: Rule 42(b)ofthe
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 39 MINN. L. REV. 743 (1955); Note, Original Separate Trials on
Issues of Damages and Liability, 48 VA. L. REV. 99 (1962).
61. Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, 161 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1958).
62. Gutor Int'l AG v. Raymond Packer Co., 493 F.2d 938, 947 (Ist Cir. 1974).
63. Rossano v. Blue Plate Foods, Inc., 314 F.2d 174, 176-77 (5th Cir. 1963).
64. Beeck v. Aquaslide 'N' Dive Corp., 562 F.2d 537, 542 (8th Cir. 1977).
65. Zenith Radio Corp. v. Hazeltine Research, Inc., 401 U.S. 321, 345 (1971).
66. 1 MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION pt. 2, 4.12, at 169 (2d
ed. 1979).
67. See Value Line Fund, Inc. v. Marcus, 161 F. Supp. 533 (S.D.N.Y. 1958) (separate trial of
defense of laches).
68. United Mine Workers v. Gibbs, 383 U.S. 715,732 (1966) (footnote omitted). "The history of
conspiracy, as Mr. Justice Jackson has pointed out, exemplifies the 'tendency of a principle to expand
itself to the limit of its logic.'" Krulewitch v. United States, 336 U.S. 440, 445 (1949) (Jackson, J.,
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are not presented by breach of contract or tort claims, including (1) the
existence of the necessary plurality of persons (in the eyes of the law);69 (2)
whether a combination or agreement existed; (3) whether the combination
was effected by concerted action to accomplish an unlawful purpose or to
accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means; 70 (4) whether overt acts
were commited by each of the conspirators in furtherance of the
conspiracy; (5) whether the plaintiff's injuries were proximately caused by
the alleged conspiracy; (6) various defenses inherent to conspiracy
actions, such as withdrawal from the conspiracy; 7' and (7) the evidentiary
problems peculiar to conspiracy trials.72
The argument in support of a motion for an early, separate trial
should always specify (1) precisely what relief is sought; (2) the resulting
benefits (in terms of trial time and expense) if the motion is granted; (3)
whether prejudice will be prevented if the motion is granted; (4) what facts
appear in the record before the court, particularly in the depositions on file
and the supporting affidavit attached to the memorandum, that justify the
relief sought; and (5) what authorities support the motion.73
3. The Use of Motions for Summary
Judgment or Separate Trial
It has long been recognized that insufficient use is made of the
techniques for separately trying one issue that could dispose of a complex
civil case. In addressing the Seminar on Protracted Cases for United States
District Judges, held at Stanford University in 1958, one speaker observed
that:
One way that we can shorten the trial of these protracted cases is to have a
separate trial of certain issues or possibly one issue. Rule 41(b), 28 U.S.C.A.
gives us ample opportunity to do that. But it has been my experience that very
concurring), citing B. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 51 (1922). See also Note,
Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 922 (1959).
69. A corporation cannot conspire with its officers or directors since the necessary duality of
persons is not present. Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir. 1952), cert.
denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953). See also Dorsey v. Chesapeake & Ohio Ry. Co., 476 F.2d 243,245-56 (4th
Cir. 1973); Chapman v. Rudd Paint & Varnish Co., 409 F.2d 635, 643 (9th Cir. 1969).
70. Harrison v. United Transp. Union, 530 F.2d 558 561 (4th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
958 (1976), held that "a civil conspiracy is a combination of two or more persons to accomplish an
unlawful purpose, or to accomplish a lawful purpose by unlawful means." See also Note,
Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 922 (1959) ("Conspiracy is
usually defined as an agreement between two or more persons to achieve an unlawful object or to
achieve a lawful object by unlawful means.").
71. Note, Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARv. L. REV. 920, 957-73
(1959).
72. In addition to the co-conspirators exception to the hearsay rule, see text accompanying notes
146-52 infra, the rule that once the existence of a conspiracy is established, only slight evidence is
sufficient to connect a defendant with it, see United States v. Richardson, 596 F.2d 157, 162 (6th Cir.
1979) may lead the jury to confuse evidence of participation in the alleged conspiracy with evidence of a
substantive breach of contract or other law. See Note, Developments in the Law-Criminal
Conspirac', 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 979, 980-81, 993.
73. This course is recommended by I MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION pt. 2, 1.70 at 94 (2d ed. 1979).
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few lawyers and not many judges take advantage of Rule 41(b) which
provides very broadly that in the furtherance of convenience the trial judge
may separately try any issue in the case. Certainly to expedite or to facilitate
the trial the trial judge may direct by pretrial order a separate trial of any
issue.74
A second speaker was also of the opinion that these procedures should be
utilized more often:
There are many cases in which the issues raised by affirmative defenses will
readily lend themselves to separate trial and disposition. It should be obvious
that in these cases, if the decision of the court on these issues results in a final
judgment dispositive of the whole litigation, there will be a distinct
advantage. The protracted case may be brought to an early end without a trial
of the issues raised by the plaintiff's claim for relief.
75
These early thoughts have now become the recommended procedure for
complex civil actions.
The Manual for Complex Litigation today recommends that early
discovery be conducted in certain circumstances, including those "where
there is a narrow issue which may be decisive on the merits, such as the
statute of limitations, res judicata, collateral estoppel,76 accord and
satisfaction, and the like. 77 When a potentially decisive issue is presented,
counsel should follow this recommendation by filing a motion for
expedited or early discovery on that issue alone. Once discovery is
completed, counsel will be in an excellent position to file and argue a
motion for an early, separate trial of that issue.
The Manualfor Complex Litigation also recommends that "separate
trials of separate issues be utilized" to achieve the benefits of more orderly
presentation of evidence, a better understanding of the evidence, and the
avoidance of unnecessary trial of other issues.78 It lists a number of issues
74. Searls, Methods of Shortening Trials, Proceedings of the Seminar of Protracted Cases for
United States Judges, 23 F.R.D. 319, 603 (1958).
75. Smith, Defining the Issues and Establishing a Plan for Trial, Proceedings of the Seminar on
Protracted Cases for United States Judges, 23 F.R.D. 319, 416 (1958).
76. In Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 99 S. Ct. 645 (1979), a stockholders' class action seeking
rescission and damages under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78a-78kk (1976),
the Supreme Court approved the offensive use of collateral estoppel, and held that a party against
whom an issue of fact had been adjudicated adversely in an equitable proceeding may be collaterally
estopped from relitigating the same issue in a legal action before ajury. See also Blonder-Tongue Labs.
Inc. v. University of Ill. Foundation, 402 U.S. 313 (1971) (permitting the defensive use of collateral
estoppel); Jacobs, Affirmative Defenses to Securities Exchange Act Rule lob-5 Actions, 61 CORNELL L.
REV. 857 (1976). Developments of this type make collateral estoppel a particularly appropriate topic
for a separate decision.
77. 1 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION pt. 2, 1.70, at 94 (2d ed.
1979) (footnote omitted). Footnote 166 to that paragraph suggests:
In Securities actions under § 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act and Rule lOb-5 of the
Securities and Exchange Commission, a possible issue for early emergency discovery to
determine whether the action may be maintained is whether the plaintiff can show any
damages as of the date they are to be measured. See, e.g., Harris v. American Investment
Company, 523 F.2d 220 (8th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 1054, 96 S. Ct. 784, 46 L.Ed 2d
643 (1976).




that may be suitable for separate trials, including the statute of limitations,
claims under different laws (for example, separation of claims under
section 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act from Robinson-Patman claims),
separation of liability and damages issues, separation of primary claims
from counter-claims, cross-claims, or third party claims, release, and
agency.
79
A motion for summary judgment and for a separate, prior trial of an
issue can be used in conjunction with expedited discovery as part of a plan
to end a particular action expeditiously. The procedure is simple: First, a
party moves for expedited discovery on a narrow issue or defense that
could be dispositive of the case, or else initiates and pursues such discovery
on his own without alerting his opponent to his intention. Next, the party
moves for summary judgment on the issue or defense that he is now
prepared to meet, which is the only issue ripe for consideration because it
alone has been developed through early discovery. Finally, if the opponent
raises a factual question in response to the motion for summary judgment,
the party promptly moves for an early, separate trial of that issue or
defense. The motion for a separate trial should be granted since (1) no
other issue or defense will have been factually or legally developed; (2) the
parties' discovery and briefing should enable them to try this issue or
defense with much less preparation than would be required for any other
issue or defense; (3) the court has been educated about the issue; and (4) an
early trial of the issue or defense will cost both the parties and the court less
time and money than a full trial on the merits.
The motion for summary judgment and the motion for an early,
separate trial complement each other. One's opponent should be trapped
between the two motions: obviously, he will not want to concede the
summary judgment motion, yet by resisting, he will almost certainly create
factual issues susceptible to decision in a separate trial. These factual issues
appear much simpler to resolve than the full panoply of issues presented by
a trial on the merits, and the judge is likely to rule in favor of the early,
separate trial. However, counsel will not be able to carry out this strategy if
he simply suggests the plan to the court or to his opponent. An aggressive
program of discovery followed immediately-that is, as soon as counsel
has accomplished sufficient discovery to support the motion-by a motion
for summary judgment and then a motion for early, separate trial provides
the best chance for disposing of a complex case on a question of one's own
choosing.
II. MOTIONS MADE AT TRIAL
There are three advantages to the use of written motions 0 submitted
immediately before trial or during the first three days of trial. First, a
79. Id. at 166-69.
80. A motion must be in writing "unless made during a hearing or trial," FED. R. Civ. P. 7(b)(1).
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written motion will receive more careful consideration by the trial judge
than will an oral motion that requests the same relief. The trial judge can
take the motion home or have his law clerk review both it and the cited
authorities, and the court will probably feel that there is less chance for
error if the motion is accompanied by a clear, thorough, and persuasive
supporting memorandum. The moving party's record for appeal is also
well preserved when a matter is drawn to the court's attention by written
motion.
Second, one's opponent must scramble to respond to a written motion
at the precise time he is colicerned with other things, such as the
preparation of his opening statement or his witnesses. At the very least,
the opponent may respond to the motion by limiting or partially
withdrawing his proposed proof, or by permitting supplemental discovery
by the moving party.
Finally, even if denied, the motion can strengthen the moving party's
position for later motions made during trial. The preliminary motion
educates the trial judge, alerts him to the presence and the details of a
critical issue, and prepares him for a later motion to strike, motion to
preclude or to exclude evidence, or motion for a directed verdict. A motion
can also serve as the predicate for voir dire of a witness on the issue,
followed by counsel's objections out of the jury's presence, or for a
cautionary or limiting instruction from the court during the testimony or
during the final charge to the jury.
A. The Proof at Trial
What evidence should be admitted at trial? A party's efforts to deal
with this issue can be divided into two subjects: preclusion orders and
exclusion orders. A preclusion order prevents a party from introducing
evidence, calling witnesses, or mentioning certain facts because the party
has violated a rule or order of the court or has failed to meet its obligations
under the discovery rules. The typical example is the motion to preclude
expert testimony, discussed below. In contrast, an exclusion order
prevents the jury from receiving or hearing evidence because of its
probable prejudicial effect or untrustworthy nature. Typical examples
include motions to exclude hearsay evidence of certain technical or
scientific proof. Preclusion orders are a function of the rules of procedure;
exclusion orders are a function of the rules of evidence.
1. Preclusion of Expert or Surprise Witnesses
A recurring problem in complex civil actions is the practice of hiding
all or part of expert testimony until the start of trial. Accordingly, the
Manual for Complex Litigation recommends early disclosure of an
expert's name, qualifications, and testimony."
81. 1 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION pt. 2, 2.60, at 112 (2d
ed. 1979):
As soon as practical, each party should be required to disclose the name, qualifications and
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It is, unfortunately, quite common in commercial litigation for one or
both parties to retain their experts late in the case, or at least to disclose the
fact that an expert will testify at trial at the last minute. The only course to
be followed when counsel learns of such a move is to file a motion to
preclude expert testimony.8 2 Specifically, the motion should ask for an
order precluding the party from offering the expert at trial, or, in the
alternative, permitting the proposed expert to testify as an expert only
after the moving party has had an opportunity to take his deposition and
has a copy of the transcript with which to prepare cross-examination.
The following procedure should be followed to be certain that one is
not surprised by an expert witness late in the preparation of a case.83 First,
early in the case, a set of interrogatories should be served upon the
opponent, requesting all information concerning the opponent's experts
permitted under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 26(b)(4). A letter should
then be sent to the opponent, requesting an opportunity in advance of trial
to depose any and all expert witnesses that the opponent has or may retain.
Counsel should telegraph his punch: the opponent should be told in the
letter that a motion will be filed to preclude testimony of any expert that
counsel is not given the opportunity to depose. This letter can later be
attached to a motion to preclude expert testimony, if such a motion
becomes necessary. A similar oral request can be made on the record
during depositions of other witnesses. The final step is a motion to
preclude expert testimony. The motion should include (1) a detailed
statement of the facts (best presented in a sworn affidavit) that support
the motion; (2) a memorandum of authorities showing the court that it
has the power to take the seemingly harsh step of preventing an expert
from testifying; (3) an explanation of the prejudice that will result to
the moving party if the motion is not granted; (4) copies of the pretrial
orders, discovery requests, or warnings of counsel that the opponent has
failed to heed; and (5) a suggested form of the preclusion order.
The courts have recognized that cross-examination of expert
witnesses is a very difficult task that frequently requires an opportunity to
content of the testimony of each expert witness proposed to be called at the trial. This should
be done in a written offer of proof. Disclosure of expert testimony is particularly desirable
when there is reason to suspect that the witnesses will express plainly divergent views.
See also id. at 4.20 (content of pretrial disclosures of expert testimony or opinion evidence).
82. "Discovery of expert opinion must not be allowed to degenerate into a game of evasion."
Voegeli v. Lewis, 568 F.2d 89, 97 (8th Cir. 1977).
83. FED. R. Civ. P. 26 (b)(4), as interpreted by the courts, requires adherence to a strict
procedure when attempting to discover the content of the testimony of an expert: "When it is
anticipated that the expert will be used as a witness at trial, and discovery is desired, a two-step
procedure must be followed: First, written interrogatories may be served; Second, if additional
discovery is desired, leave of the court must be obtained." Norfin, Inc. v. International Bus. Mach.
Corp., 74 F.R.D. 529, 532 (D. Colo. 1977). Accord, In re IBM Peripheral EDP Devices Antitrust
Litigation, 77 F.R.D. 39, 41 (N.D. Cal. 1977); United States v. International Bus. Mach. Corp., 72
F.R.D. 78, 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1976). A party does not waive the requirement of prior interrogatories by
permitting the expert to testify at his deposition. Breedlovev. Beech Aircraft Corp., 57 F.R.D. 202,204
(N.D. Miss. 1972).
Many state provisions modeled on FED. R. Civ. P. 26 have a similar two-step procedure. See, e.g.,
Omo R. Civ. P. 26(B)(4); VA. SuP. CT. R. 4:1(b)(4).
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depose the expert if it is to be conducted effectively. A party can "be
precluded from calling an expert witness in trial if discovery called for is
not provided sufficiently in advance to enable [a party] to prepare for
effective cross-examination. 84 The fact that the information is available
elsewhere is not a basis for defeating attempts to obtain discovery from an
expert:
The grounds of confusion and availability of information as reasons for
denying discovery are neither persuasive nor applicable. The basic purpose of
discovery is to prevent confusion, and it does not appear to me how full
discovery, even discovery of an opinion of ultimate value, if permitted, could
possibly result in confusion. It is the rare law suit in which there are not at
least two versions of a single transaction or occurrence. The purpose of
discovery is to permit each party to learn of the other party's version. That the
versions may conflict creates a question for the trier of the fact, but hardly
creates a basis to refuse discovery.
From the very nature of the questions eliciting opinions sought to be
answered, there is no basis to believe that the information sought to be
elicited, since it is subjective in nature, might be obtained by the defendants
except by the questions being answered by the only person, the expert, who
has such information. It is to be noted in this regard that one of the express
uses of depositions is that of cross-examination, Rule 26(d)(1), and it needs
no citation of authority to say that an expert is the most difficult witness to
cross-examine, particularly if one is unaware until trial of the substance of his
testimony.
85
The courts' distaste for "last minute" expert witnesses is well doc-
umented. For example, in one action in which the plaintiffs did not give
notice of an expert until after the trial had begun, the court first ordered a
one and one-half day recess so the defendants could depose the witness,
then, dissatisfied with the results, refused to allow the expert to testify.
86
The court's reasoning was clear: "[I]t is plainly evident that the plaintiffs'
dilemma is attributable entirely to a failure to properly prepare for trial
although more than ample time was available. The consequences cannot
be visited on defendants."87 Similarly, in another action, the Fifth Circuit
held that a trial court had erred when it denied the defendant's motions to
withdraw his announcement of readiness for trial and to exclude expert
testimony on certain damage issues after the plaintiff asserted, on the first
day of trial, that his injuries were more complicated than he had disclosed
during discovery and that he would substantiate those injuries through the
testimony of an expert whose name had never been given to the defend-
ant.88 In commenting upon the reasons why the motion to exclude the
84. Wallace v. Shade Tobacco Growers Agric. Ass'n, Inc., 21 Fed. R. Serv. 2d 1130, 1132 (D.
Mass. 1975).
85. United States v. 23.76 Acres of Land, 32 F.R.D. 593, 596 (D. Md. 1963).
86. Tabatchnick v. G.D. Searle & Co., 67 F.R.D. 49 (D.N.J. 1975).
87. Id. at 57.
88. Shelak v. White Motor Co., 581 F.2d 1155 (5th Cir. 1978). In responding to interrogatories
filed more than one year before trial the plaintiff had indicated that only his back had been injured. At
trial, however, plaintiff asserted that he had also suffered injury to his cardiovascular system and
proposed to introduce an expert who would support his allegation.
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expert testimony should have been granted, the court of appeals stated:
Of course, it may well be possible in many cases for able counsel on an
overnight basis to prepare and defend against last-minute claims by his
adversary. Certainly, that sort of emergency litigation which could
degenerate into "quick-draw h shooting" is precisely what the discovery
rules were designed to prevent.
A similar result was reached in Weiss v. Chrysler Motor Corp,90 a product
liability action in which the court reversed a judgment for the defendant
and remanded for new trial because the defendant had failed to inform the
plaintiff of a change in its theory concerning the cause of the accident in
which plaintiff was injured. In reaching this conclusion the court noted
that plaintiff's knowledge of the information was irrelevant,9' and that the
defendant had a continuing obligation (that did not end when the trial
began) to supplement its responses to interrogatories concerning the
subject and substance of expert testimony.92
2. Preclusion of Evidence in General
The Manual for Complex Litigation recommends the use of
preclusion orders in complex cases:
The court should announce to counsel at an early stage in the pretrial
proceedings of a complex case that, except for good cause appearing, (I)
preclusion orders (refusing to allow a party to support or oppose certain
claims or defenses or to offer certain evidence as sanctions for failure to make
discovery) will be entered or other sanctions will be applied for failure or
refusal to comply with discovery obligations and orders, and (2) the parties
will also be precluded from offering in evidence or otherwise raising any legal
or factual matters not included in the final pretrial brief.93
A number of courts have put teeth into discovery and final pretrial orders
94
by limiting testimony to the issues specified in the final pretrial order. One
of the best opinions dealing with this subject is Admiral Theatre Corp. v.
Douglas Theatre Corp.," a decision of the Eighth Circuit that affirmed
findings in the defendant's favor in an complex antitrust action that had
been tried to a jury. The court make it clear that trial courts have the power
to cull unimportant and potential confusing issues from a case:
The district court exercised its discretion in limiting the scope of discovery
and proof at trial to what the court perceived were the central issues. The
district court must be free to use and control pretrial procedure so to insure
89. Id. at 1159.
90. 515 F.2d 449 (2d Cir. 1975).
91. Id. at 456.
92. Id. at 457.
93. 1 MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION pt. 2, 1.11, at 18 (2d ed.
1979) (footnote omitted).
94. See, e.g., S.D. OHIO R. 3.11; N.D. TEx. R. 8.1. Final pretrial orders are not used in all courts,
but many courts, particularly federal district courts, do require their use.
95. 585 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1978).
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the orderly administration of justice. Link v. Wabash R.R., 291 F.2d 542,547
(7th Cir. 1961), aft'd, 370 U.S. 626,82 S.Ct. 1386,8 L.Ed.2d 734(1962). Inhis
pretrial role, the district judge must at times assume the active part of
"director of litigation * * * [free to] strip the controversy of nonessentials,
and to mold it into such form as will make it possible to dispose of the contest
properly with the least possible waste of time and expense." Bufijngton v.
Wood, 351 F.2d 292,298 (3d Cir. 1965), quotingfrom Committee on Pretrial
Procedure to the Judicial Conference of the District of Columbia, Report, 4
Fed. Rules Serv.L.R. 47 (1941). The district court's discretionary power to
limit discovery and proof at trial extends to complex litigation involving
lengthy discovery procedures. See Aviation Specialties, Inc. v. United
Technologies Corp., supra, 568 F.2d at 1189-90; 1 Pt. 2 Moore's Federal
Practice 2.40 (2d ed. 1978) (hereafter Manual for Complex Litigation).
In the present complex litigation, we find no abuse of discretion by the district
court. Federal Deposit Ins. Corp. v. Glickman, 450 F.2d 416, 419 (9th Cir.
1971); Davis v. Duplantis, 448 F.2d 918, 921 (5th Cir. 1971).96
The court also held that the trial court properly denied admission to
forty-six trial exhibits on the ground that they were not called to the
defendants' attention before trial:
The plaintiffs object to the trial court's ruling which denied admission to
46 exhibits offered by the plaintiffs pertaining to specific licensing
transactions. The court excluded the exhibits on two grounds: (1) they were
not called to the attention of the defendants prior to trial, and (2) they could
only be considered cumulative.
At the pretrial conference on February 22, 1977, the district court
informed the parties that the action would be processed under the procedures
specified in the Manual for Complex Litigation and that pretrial filings of
witness lists, exhibit lists, stipulations, proposed jury instructions and pretrial
briefs would be required and strictly enforced. See Manual for Complex
Litigation, supra, §§ 1.11, 3.30. Contrary to the pretrial orders of the court,
the plaintiffs did not file their pretrial briefs or list of exhibits until the first day
of trial on June 13, 1977. In addition, the 46 exhibits related to specific
pictures regarding which the plaintiffs had made no complaint during pretrial
discovery. As a result the defendants would have been prejudiced by
admission of the exhibits in that they were unprepared to cross-examine or
present their own evidence relating to these transactions. If it admitted these
exhibits, the district court felt that to avoid prejudice to defendants it would
have been compelled to grant a continuance to allow the defendants an
opportunity for discovery on the new issues raised.
In a complex case the trial court must manage the proceedings with a fair
but firm hand to prevent excess expense and delay. See Gaylord Shops, Inc. v.
South Hills Shoppers' City, Inc., 33 F.R.D. 303,305 (W.D.Pa. 1963); Manual
for Complex Litigation, supra, § 1.10; Prettyman Report, Procedure in Anti-
Trust and Other Protracted Cases, 13 F.R.D. 41, 65-66 (1951). The district
court has the discretionary power to exclude exhibits not disclosed in
compliance with its pretrial orders. Kozar v. Chesapeake & 0. Ry., 320
F.Supp. 335, 374 (W.D.Mich. 1970), aff'd in part & vacated in part for other
96. Id at 889. Other decisions supporting a strong, active role for the trial judge in complex cases
include Geders v. United States, 425 U.S. 80,86-87 (1976), and Paramount Film Distrib. Corp. v. Civil
Center Theatre, Inc., 333 F.2d 358, 362 (10th Cir. 1964). The use of written motions helps the court
structure the controversy, and, in many cases, reduces the complexities of a case.
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reasons, 449 F.2d 1238 (6th Cir. 1971); Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b) (2) (B); Manual for
Complex Litigation, supra, §§ 3.30, 4.23; D.Neb.R. 25(B) (1). Its ruling will
be overturned on appeal only if there is a clear abuse of its discretion.97
The court then upheld the exclusion of the testimony of a witness listed on
the first day of trial:
Similar to its discretionary power to exclude exhibits, the district court may
refuse to permit the testimony of witnesses not listed prior to trial. United
States v. Pirnie, 472 F.2d 712,713 (8th Cir. 1973); Fed.R.Civ.P. 37 (b) (2) (B);
Moore's Federal Practice 16.16, at 1127 (2d ed. 1974); Manual for Complex
Litigation, supra, §§ 3.30,4.23; D.Neb.R. 25(B) (2) (D). The power of the trial
court to exclude exhibits and witnesses not disclosed in compliance with its
discovery and pretrial orders is essential to the judicial management of a
complex case. When the district court's ruling is considered as part of the total
procedural history of this case, we are convinced that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in refusing to allow Corbino to testify.98
Finally, the trial court's ruling limiting discovery of proof of damages was
upheld:
Orders by a trial court limiting discovery are within the sound discretion of
the court and will not be cause for reversal unless an abuse of discretion is
shown. Perel v. Vanderford, 547 F.2d 278, 280 (5th Cir. 1977); Huffv. N.D.
Cass Co., 468 F.2d 172, 176-77 (5th Cir. 1972); modifieden banc, 485-F.2d 710
(1973); Barnard v. Wabash R.R., 208 F.2d 489,498 (8th Cir. 1953). No such
showing has been made here. In a complex case to keep discovery within
bounds of reason and relevancy the court must establish limits of time and
subject matter. Manual for Complex Litigation, supra, §§ 2.40, 4.30;
Prettyman Report, Procedure in Anti-Trust and Other Protracted Cases,
supra, 13 F.R.D. at 73-74.99
Other cases have considered similar issues and have held that the
courts have the power to exercise control over pre-trial discovery and trial
evidence. Cine Forty-Second Street Theatre Corp. v. Allied Artist Picture
Corp.100 was an antitrust action in which the court held that the trial court
had properly ordered the preclusion of the plaintiff's proof of damages
under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37, although the order was
tantamount to dismissal of the claim. The plaintiff's belated compliance
with an order requiring it to answer interrogatories was given little weight
since, in the opinion of the court, a lenient remedy would encourage
dilatory tactics.' 0 '
Similarly, in Associated Press v. Cook'0 2 the court affirmed summary
97. 585 F.2d at 896-97.
98. Id. at 897-98.
99. Id. at 898.
100. [1979-2] Trade Cas. 62,778 (2d Cir. 1979).
101. Id. at 78,469. The court also indicated that a written court order is not necessarily a
prerequisite to the imposition of sanctions under Rule 37. Id. at 78,466 n.5. Counsel will find this ruling
helpful since a court will often make on-the-record statements that a party should take certain actions
in discovery, although the order is not put into a formal written order to be filed with the clerk. The
party failing or refusing to accomplish the ordered actions should, nonetheless, be penalized.
102. 513 F.2d 1300, 1303 (10th Cir. 1975).
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judgment in favor of the plaintiff in a breach of contract action when the
final pretrial order contained an agreement of the parties " 'that the
amounts claimed by the Plaintiff as shown by the Complaint and
Plaintiff's exhibits are accurate and are the proper measure of damages to
Plaintiff unless Defendant had a right to terminate the agreement.' "The
court rejected the argument that summary judgment was improper
because the alleged unconscionability of damages presented a genuine
issue of material fact, holding that "parties are bound by their admissions
and stipulations included in a pre-trial order."1°3 And, in Moore v.
Tangipahoa Parish School Board,0 4 the court held that the defendants
had waived the defenses of laches and the statute of limitations by not
raising them in a pretrial memorandum or in the post-trial brief.
A more balanced approach was taken in DeMarines v. KLM Royal
Dutch Airlines,'15 in which the court reversed a lower court's exclusion of
the testimony of a physician whose report had not been provided to
plaintiff in accordance with a pretrial order since it found little surprise or
prejudice to plaintiff. The court considered five factors in determining
whether the "drastic sanction"'10 6 of exclusion should be applied:
1. The prejudice or surprise in fact of the party against whom the excluded
witnesses would have testified;
2. the ability of that party to cure the prejudice;
3. the extent to which waiver of the rule against calling unlisted witnesses
would disrupt the orderly and efficient trial of the case or of other cases
in the court;
4. bad faith or willfulness in failing to comply with the court's order;'07 and
5. the practical importance of the evidence excluded. 0 8
The Sixth Circuit reached a similar result in Morelock v. NCR Corp.,0 9 an
age discrimination action in which the plaintiffs entered into a stipulation
that they were laid off due to lack of work within their vocation. The court
held that this stipulation in the final pretrial order precluded evidence that
they were laid off for any other reason: "A party is bound by what he
stipulates. The above stipulation gives the reason why plaintiffs were laid
off, namely, there was no work for senior techs. This stipulation in our
opinion, should preclude the plaintiffs from claiming that they were laid off
for any other reason."'" 0 A similar case is Davisv. Marathon Oil Co.,", an
antitrust action in which the court upheld an order "refusing to permit the
'eleventh hour' witnesses to testify because their names had been furnished
103. Id.
104. 594 F.2d 489, 495 (5th Cir. 1979).
105. 580 F.2d 1193, 1201-02 (3d Cir. 1978).
106. Id. at 1202.
107. Id. at 1201-02, citing Meyers v. Pennypack Woods, 559 F.2d 894, 904 (3d Cir. 1977).
108. 580 F.2d at 1202.
109. 586 F.2d 1096 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1995 (1979).
110. 586 F.2d at 1107.
111. 528 F.2d 395 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 823 (1976).
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in supplemental answers to interrogatories only three days before trial was
scheduled to begin."' 12 The court noted:
In the short time afforded, there was virtually no way for Marathon to
prepare adequately to respond to the testimony of the surprise witnesses.
Unfair surprise of this sort is contrary to the policy of the federal rules, which
sanction extensive discovery. If appellant had refused to answer the
interrogatory in question, Marathon could have obtained an order requiring
appellant to answer under Rule 37(a). Then, if appellant still refused to
answer, or answered incompletely, Rule 37(b) provides that the court could
issue '[a]n order . . . prohibiting . . . [the disobedient party] from
introducing designated matters in evidence. . . .' Since Marathon did not
know that the original answer was incomplete, it did not move for an order
under Rule 37(b) to compel appellant to complete it. Even though Rule 37(b)
is not directly applicable, we hold that the trial judge properly exercised
discretion in regard to the surprise witnesses and that any other decision
would be contrary to the policy of Rule 37.113
The court also pointed out that "[a] trial court has broad discretion in its
choice of sanctions for failure to comply with discovery orders and, in
appropriate circumstances, it may even dismiss the case."' 4 National
Hockey League v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc.,'l5 a case decided after
Davis, upheld the dismissal of an action for failure to timely answer
interrogatories. Similarly, in Monogram Models, Inc. v. Industro Motive
Corp.,116 a copyright infringement action, the court held that there was no
error in granting a default judgment in favor of the plaintiff on the issue of
damages after the defendant failed to comply with the trial court's order to
answer six previously unanswered interrogatories within five days.
However, in Mains v. United States 1 7 the court held that taxpayers
were not precluded from relying on a section of the Internal Revenue Code
by their statement of the issues in the final pretrial order when (1) there was
nothing in the final pretrial order "which limits the taxpayers to any
particular section of the Internal Revenue Code,""' 8 and (2) the issue had
been tried by consent of the parties." 9 To exclude evidence for failure to
abide by a final pretrial order, therefore, the party seeking exclusion must
112. 528 F.2d at 403.
113. Idat 404.
114. Id at 403. See also International Bus. Mach. Corp. v. United States, 493 F.2d 112 (2d Cir.
1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 995 (1974) (upholding an order of civil contempt and a fine of$150,000 per
day for refusal to comply with a pretrial discovery order).
115. 427 U.S. 639 (1976). See also VonBrimer v. Whirlpool Corp., 536 F.2d 838,842-44 (9th Cir.
1976) (upholding the exclusion of documents produced on the eve of trial).
116. 492 F.2d 1281, 1287-1288 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 843 (1974).
117. 508 F.2d 1251, 1259 (6th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 569 (1978). See also Perfection
Cobey Co. v. City Tank Corp., 597 F.2d 419, 421 (4th Cir. 1979). In re Intercontinental Properties
Management, S.A., 604 F.2d 254,259 (4th Cir. 1979), held that a trial court may hold a party"estopped
by its litigation conduct to have an issue considered by the trier of fact" under FED. R. Civ. P. 16 when
the "party has failed to identify an issue for inclusion in a pretrial order while under a clear duty to do
so.,
118. 508 F.2d at 1258.
119. Id. at 1258-59. See FED. R. Civ. P. 15(b).
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raise the issue of a violation of a specific provision of the order. In order to
make a successful motion on this subject, it is also essential that counsel
serve early discovery requests (request for production of documents and
interrogatories) and follow these requests with a clear pretrial order in
which the parties are required to list witnesses and trial exhibits by a
specific date. If a local rule or order does not require a final pretrial order,
counsel for plaintiff or defendant may propose to the court (often by
informal oral request in pretrial conferences) that certain requirements be
imposed by court order.1
20
The use of final pretrial orders to determine issues and set filing dates
avoids reliance on orders in limine. This practice is advisable since, as
Sperberg v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. 121 points out, "[o]rders in limine
which exclude broad categories of evidence should rarely be employed.' 22
Of course, the use of orders in limine cannot be eliminated completely since
the very mention of some evidence may prejudice the jury.' 23
3. Exclusion of Evidence
Motions to exclude evidence have a twofold purpose. They are, of
course, directed at preventing the admission of evidence that should be
excluded under one or more of the rules of evidence. More importantly,
motions to exclude evidence attempt to prevent the jury from hearing
evidence that is extremely harmful to one's case by instructing counsel and
witnesses that they may not mention a particular subject. A written motion
naturally performs this function better than an oral objection imposed at
trial.
In contrast to preclusion motions, the procedures for excluding
120. For example, the author frequently requests the trial judge to enter an order (1) setting a
discovery cutoff date, (2) requiring that the parties simultaneously exchange witness lists on or before a
specified date, and (3) requiring that the parties simultaneously exchange books of trial exhibits on or
before a specified date.
A discovery cutoff date is not the date beyond which no discovery may be had by any party.
Rather, it is the date beyond which neither party can force the other to respond to or to engage in
discovery. After the discovery cutoffdate the court will not intervene in discovery disputes. Discovery
beyond the cutoffdate may be had by the parties' mutual cooperation and agreement. For example,
since experts are often retained late in the progress of a case, the author has made agreements with
opponents in which each side agrees to permit a deposition of its expert witness after the discovery
cutoff date, but no depositions of the clients or other fact witnesses are conducted. See also In re
Airport Car Rental Antitrust Litigation, [1979-2] Trade Cas. 62,746 (N.D. Cal. 1979), which granted
the defendants' motion for a pretrial order with respect to burden of proof of damages in an antitrust
action. The relevant allegation was that defendants excluded other automobile rental companies from
the airport automobile rental market at a number of airports. The defendants' suggested order,
approved by the court, required the plaintiff to present evidence at trial from which the jury could
conclude that there was a causal connection between the allegedly unlawful acts of defendants and
plaintiff's claimed exclusion from each airport. An order granting such a motion would provide an
excellent basis for a later motion to preclude proof of damages, on the ground that the plaintifffailed to
make the showing required by the pretrial order.
121. 519 F.2d 708 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 987 (1975).
122. Id. at 712.
123. See text accompanying notes 175-76 infra, dealing with prior consent decrees, and notes
146-52 infra, dealing with hearsay evidence.
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evidence are spelled out in the Federal Rule of Evidence. 24 Several
provisions in the Rules lend support to a pretrial motion to exclude
evidence, or to hold a hearing concerning the admissibility of evidence out
of the presence of the jury. Rule 103(c) provides that: "In jury cases,
proceedings shall be conducted, to the extent practicable, so as to prevent
inadmissible evidence from being suggested to thejury by any means, such
as making statements or offers of proof or asking questions in the hearing
of the jury." Rule 104, which deals with preliminary questions, also
provides that hearings shall be conducted out of the hearing of the jury
"when the interests ofjustice require," which will certainly be the case when
the moving party is claiming that evidence would prejudice or confuse the
jury. Finally, Rule 105 provides that "[w]hen evidence which is admissible
as to one party or for one purpose but not admissible as to another party or
for another purpose is admitted, the court, upon request, shall restrict the
evidence to its proper scope and instruct thejury accordingly." Counsel, of
course, has a better chance of obtaining such an instruction if the request is
made through a written motion.
In addition, relevant evidence may be excluded under Federal Rule of
Evidence 403 "if its probative value is substantially outweighed by the
danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury,
or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless
presentation of cumulative evidence." This provision forms an excellent
basis for a motion to exclude evidence which, although relevant, could
prejudice or confuse the jury. The range of evidence that can be excluded
under this Rule is almost limitless, and the courts should exclude such
evidence if the moving party can show both risk of prejudice and the
cumulative nature of the evidence. 125 Cumulation can be proved before
trial by reference to deposition testimony or to specific exhibits in the
parties' list of trial exhibits which would adequately establish a point.
Specific evidentiary questions are discussed below.
Damages. A theory of damages must be grounded soundly in the
evidence presented at trial and must not be speculative. Yet, because
complex civil litigation often requires proof of loss of profits or market
share, a plaintiff may attempt to establish damages through speculation
and conjecture. A defendant need not resign himself to permitting these
tactics.
The types of evidence likely to be used to prove damages were
summarized in Flintkote Co. v. Lysfjord,126 an antitrust action:
124. The early resolution of evidentiary issues of controlling importance is encouraged by the
Manual for Complex Litigation. See I MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX
LITIGATION, pt. 2, 1.80, at 95-96 (2d ed. 1979). But see In re Beef Indus. Antitrust Litigation, 600 F.2d
1148, 1170 (5th Cir. 1979).
125. If the moving party can show only the former factor, risk of prejudice, and not the latter, it
may be appropriate for the court to admit the evidence (since it is not cumulative and hence would have
some probative value) and give the jury a cautionary or limiting instruction to cure any possible
prejudice.
126. 246 F.2d 368 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957).
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There are three chief types of evidence which the decisions have approved as
the basis for the award of damages. (1) Business records of the plaintiff or his
predecessor before the conspiracy arose. (2) Business records of comparative
but unrestricted enterprises during the period in question. (3) Expert opinion
based on items (I) and (2).127
Even these types of evidence can be challenged. First, the accuracy or
completeness of the business records relied upon by the plaintiff may be
challenged. A successful challenge will usually require cross-examination
of the plaintiff's witness and, since the goal is proving the unreliability of
the records rather than their lack of authenticity, testimony of defendant's
own expert. Second, the qualifications of the plaintiff's expert may be
challenged.128 Because a party's self-serving testimony is more damaging
when cloaked in the mantle of expert testimony, a pretrial motion, seeking
to limit the plaintiff to the views he could express as a layman, should be
filed whenever the plaintiff intends to testify personally as an expert.
Counsel must be prepared to argue such a motion vigorously, since the
qualifications of an expert are within the sound discretion of the court.2 9
As the Ninth Circuit has noted, "[T]he trial court is vested with broad
discretion concerning the admissibility or exclusion of expert testimony
and the court's action is to be sustained unless shown to be manifestly
erroneous."
130
The measure of damages and the considerations that apply will vary
depending upon the nature of the action. There are three traditional
measures of damages in an antitrust action:13 ' (1) the before and after
approach (which compares a plaintiff's profit or loss in two distinct time
periods, using his own business and its performance to calculate damages);
(2) the yardstick theory (which compares the plaintiff's profits during the
period in which the antitrust violations occurred to those of a similar
company that was not adversely affected by the antitrust violations); and
(3) the market share theory (which establishes the market share lost by
plaintiff in dollars and multiplies the dollar volume by the plaintiff's profit
127. 246 F.2d at 392 (footnotes omitted).
128. Consider the following statement from California Steel & Tube v. Kaiser Steel Corp., 469
F. Supp. 265, 269 (C.D. Cal. 1979):
Dr. Marshall is an economist, not an accountant, and therefore, is not qualified to analyze
and synthesize accounting data from the books and records of the defendant, which
accounting data are essential to any sort of expert testimony on predatory pricing below
marginal cost.
129. Salem v. United States Lines Co., 370 U.S. 31, 35 (1962) ("Furthermore, the trialjudgehas
broad discretion in the matter of the admission of exclusion of expert evidence, and his action is to be
sustained unless manifestly erroneous."). This principle was recently restated in Hamling v. United
States, 418 U.S. 87, 108 (1974): "IT]he District Court has wide discretion in its determination to admit
or exclude testimony." Accord, United States v. Snow, 552 F.2d 165, 168 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 970 (1977). United States v. Barker, 553 F.2d 1013, 1024 (6th Cir. 1977).
130. Reno-West Coast Dist. Co. v. Mead Corp., "1979-I] Trade Cas. 62,544 at 77,152 (9th
Cir.), cert. denied, [1979] TRADE REG. REP. (CCH) 60,021 (1979).
131. See generally Hoyt, Comprehensive Models for Assessing Lost Profits to Antitrust
Plantiffs, 60 MINN. L. REV. 1233 (1976). As to damages to cases under the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2
(1976), see Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 603 F.2d 263, 296-97 (2d Cir. 1979).
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margin). All of these theories are subject to attack on the ground that they
use records or assumptions that are speculative and without a basis in the
evidence.
3 2
There are at least two measures of damages in securities fraud
actions. 3 For the defrauded seller, the measure is the difference between
what the seller received and what he would have received had there been no
fraudulent conduct.1 3 4 There is also a measure of damages similar to the
traditional "out-of-pocket" rule, that is, rescissionary or restitutional
damages. 35 This theory is based upon the policy that: "It is more
appropriate to give the defrauded party the benefit even of windfalls than
to let the fraudulent party keep them.' 36 The standard of damages has also
been stated as disgorgement of profits.
137
Complex commercial cases other than antitrust and securities actions
will also benefit from the close examination and exclusion of testimony
based upon unsupported or speculative assumptions:
We note, however, that the claims of both Goldgar and Buckeye as to both
liability and damages are infested with speculation about the potential
profitability of an office building without any profit history in Atlanta's
admittedly unstable real estate market in 1975 which has not been fully
developed on the record presented to the Court. Expert testimony on this
issue which serves only to limit the range of the jury's speculation is
inadmissible, see American Air Filter Co. v. McNichol, 527 F.2d 1297 (3d
132. See, e.g., Kaplan v. Burroughs Corp., 426 F. Supp. 1328, 1334 (N.D. Cal. 1977) (antitrust
action in which the court stated that the plaintiff"sought to fill the gap in specific factual evidence by so-
called expert opinion. This was not in fact opinion evidence but consisted of statements which were
unsupported by factual testimony and were inflationary, inaccurate, imaginative, and inconsistent."
(emphasis in original) ); Battista v. Lebanon Trotting Ass'n, 538 F.2d 111, 119 (6th Cir. 1976) (contract
action in which the court stated that it was "wholely [sic] speculative for Battista to testify here that he
would have realized an increase of annual profits of more than 300% of the 1967 contract if the contract
had not been repudiated"). Randy's Studebaker Sales, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 553 F.2d 510, 517
(10th Cir. 1976) ("We are mindful that computations by experts cannot be based on conjecture or be
unsupported by the record."); Yoder Brothers, Inc. v. California-Florida Plant Corp., 537 F.2d 1347,
1369-72 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1094 (1977) (antitrust action); Coleman Motor Co. v.
Chrysler Corp., 525 F.2d 1338, 1353 (3d Cir. 1975) (antitrust action stating that "plaintiff's projections
fail to account for significant factors bearing upon its diminished market share").
Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc. v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd., 416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970), was an unsuccessful treble damage action by a wholesale liquor
distributor against distilleries and others. The court there examined a plaintiff's proof of damages and
found it insufficient because it was based on unwarranted assumptions and was therefore speculative.
416 F.2d at 85-87. The court concluded that "[p]laintiff's charts are an 'array of figures conveying a
delusive impression of exactness in an area where ajury's common sense is less available than usual to
protect it.' "416 F.2d at87, quoting Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 297 F.2d 906,
912 (2d Cir. 1962). Accord, Gray v. Shell Oil Co., 469 F.2d 742, 749-50 (9th Cir. 1972).
133. See generally 4 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES FRAUD & COMMODITIES FRAUD § 9.1 (1975);
Comment, Private Remedies Available Under Rule lob-5, 20 Sw. L.J. 620 (1966).
134. Nickels v. Koehler Management Corp., 541 F.2d 611,617 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429
U.S. 1074 (1977). See also Shapiro v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner& Smith, 495 F.2d 228,242 (2d Cir.
1974).
135. See Reder, Measuring Buyer's Damages in lOb-5 Cases, 31 Bus. LAW. 1839 (1976).
136. Nickels v. Koehler Management Corp., 541 F.2d 611,618 (6th Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429
U.S. 1074 (1977), quoting the leading case of Janigan v. Taylor, 344 F.2d 781, 786 (1st Cir.), cert.
denied, 382 U.S. 879 (1965). See also Myzelv. Fields, 386 F.2d 718,741-47 (8th Cir. 1967), cert. denied,
390 U.S. 951 (1968).
137. Ohio Drill & Tool Co. v. Johnson, 498 F.2d 186, 190 (6th Cir. 1974).
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Cir. 1975); see also Weinglass v. Gibson, 304 Pa. 203, 155 A. 439 (1931);
Western Show v. Mix, 308 Pa. 215, 162 A. 667 (1932); Eazor Express, Inc. v.
Int'l. Bhd. of Teamsters, 520 F.2d 951 (3d Cir. 1975); McBrayer v. Teckla,
Inc., 496 F.2d 122 (5th Cir. 1974); Neville Chemical Co. v. Union Carbide
Co., 422 F.2d 1205, 1225-27 (3d Cir. 1970), cert. den. 400 U.S. 826, 91 S.Ct.
51, 27 L.Ed.2d 55 (1970)."s
In one very complex breach of contract and breach of warranty action over
a contract to manufacture and deliver ninety-nine jet air planes, the Fifth
Circuit explained that trial judges must closely examine an expert's
testimony to prevent errors or unsupported assumptions from being
placed before the jury since "some telling errors may become virtually
unreviewable once the jury has returned its verdict."13 9
The District Court must do more than merely weigh the probative value
of an expert's testimony considered as a whole. Where practical, a trial judge
should exclude particular assumptions or other aspects of an expert's
testimony which considered individually do not meet the "minimum of
probative value." Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machinery Corp.,
supra, 297 F.2d at 912. This more detailed scrutiny is necessary because some
telling errors may become virtually unreviewable once the jury has returned
its verdict.
In this case, for example, Wemple should have considered whether
Eastern's estimated loss of profits was reduced by the cost of financing those
planes which were purchased rather than leased. McDonnell argues that this
was an error which overstated the airline's lost profits by $1.6 million.
However, because Eastern was awarded only 85 per cent of the damages
estimated by Wemple, it cannot be said that McDonnell's cross-examination
did not bring this point home to the jury. In complicated or technical cases,
therefore, an expert's testimony should be cleansed of unsupportable
assumptions or clear errors which have less than the minimum of probative
value. This would reduce the possibility of a confused jury and an arbitrary
verdict.
140
Similarly the Sixth Circuit has stated that the courts should prevent "a
projection of statistical data so attenuated as to be reductio ad absurdum,
thus allowing damages to be ballooned beyond all rational experience. ' '1 41
Counsel can make a good record of such defects in his opponent's case by
attaching excerpts from the deposition of the opponent's own experts to
the motion.
Hearsay. Because complex civil actions, particularly antitrust and
securities fraud actions, often turn on statements made by the defendant or
his associates, hearsay is a key consideration. Discovery, particularly
depositions, will often disclose that testimony of a witness is based on
138. Mellon Bank, N.A. v. Aetna Bus. Credit, Inc., 468 F. Supp. 656, 669 (W.D. Pa. 1979).
139. Eastern Air Lines, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas Corp., 532 F.2d 957, 1000 (5th Cir. 1976)
(footnotes omitted).
140. Id.
141. Morvant v. Construction Aggregates Corp., 570 F.2d 626, 632 n.5 (6th Cir.), cert.
dismissed, 439 U.S. 801 (1978).
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hearsay, and the defendant should be certain to file written motions to
exclude the hearsay. Hearsay testimony admitted under the co-conspirator
exception is one type of evidence that is very harmful and should always be
made the subject of a written motion to exclude the evidence. "Chain
hearsay"-that is, evidence in which the witness testifies that he was told by
Declarant A that Declarant B had said such and such-can also be very
damaging, and should be excluded by written motion so one's opponent
cannot "inadvertently" bring it to the jury's attention. Testimony
concerning what has been told a witness, about, for example, a conspiracy
to put someone out of business or to fix the price of a commodity, can be
devastating. Testimony of this nature is precisely the abuse against which
the hearsay rule was designed to guard since there is no way to clarify
the statements through cross-examination.
142
There are a number of bases for challenging hearsay testimony of the
type that is likely to be troublesome in complex civil actions.1 ' For
example, a chain of hearsay is not admissible unless every statement in the
chain is admissible under an exception to the hearsay rule. 144 With respect
to the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule, counsel can also argue
that there is insufficient preliminary proof of a conspiracy to justify
admission, or that the statement proffered was not made by a co-
conspirator or was not made in furtherance of the conspiracy.1
45
The co-conspirator exception is worthy of more extensive treatment
since it will frequently be raised in complex civil actions. Most of the cases
dealing with the co-conspirator exception to the hearsay rule are criminal
cases,14 6 which have established numerous rules limiting its applicability.
First, the preliminary question of admissibility of such statements is for the
court, not the jury.t47 Second, the statement may not be introduced unless
142. See, e.g., Janich Bros., Inc. v. American Distilling Co., 570 F.2d 848, 859 (9th Cir. 1977),
cert. denied, 439 U.S. 829 (1978), an antitrust action in which the court upheld the rejection of the
following statement:
The evidence offered but rejected was testimony by Mr. Moise Silber. Silber would have
testified that he was told by Mr. Roy Sherwin, a former salesman for American, that Sherwin
and Mr. Buck, the executive vice-president of American, had engaged in several
conversations over the years during the course of which Buck had stated that American was
going to lower the prices on gin and vodka in California, run the rectifiers out of business and
then increase prices.
143. See generally Note, Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REv.
920, 984-88 (1959).
144. FED. R. EvID. 805.
145. FED. R. EvID. 801(d)(2) provides that a statement is not hearsay if "thestatement is offered
against the party and is . . . (E) a statement by a co-conspirator of a party during the course and in
furtherance of the conspiracy."
146. Hitchman Coal& Coke Co. v. Mitchell, 245 U.S. 229,249(1917), a case decided priorto the
enactment of the Federal Rules of Evidence, and United States v. Williams, 435 F.2d 642,645 (9th Cir.
1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 995 (1971), a case decided contemporaneously with enactment of the
Rules. both recognized that the co-conspirator exception is based upon the law of partnership and
upon the principle that each member of a scheme is constituted the agent of all the members of the
scheme, so that the act or declaration of one member in furtherance of the common object is the act of
every member and is therefore admissible against them.
147. United States v. Mitchell, 556 F.2d 371, 377 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 925 (1977)
(collecting cases). Cf. FED. R. EvID. 104 (a), (b). United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980,984 (6th Cir.
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a sufficient showing is first made, independent of the statement sought to
be introduced, that a conspiracy exists.1 48 Third, if the declarant's
statement is no more than his account of the facts of the defendant's
supposed past activities, amounting to a narration of events or an
accusation of the defendant, it is not within the co-conspirator exception
because it is not "in furtherance of the conspiracy" under either Federal
Rule of Evidence 801(d)(2)(E) or under the traditional statement of the
exception. 149 In addition, the statement is not made "in furtherance of the
conspiracy" if it is a statement made after the termination or culmination
of a common plan or scheme-for example, a statement made after the
conspiracy has ended.' 50 However, the scope of the conspiracy alleged in
the indictment does not limit the application of the co-conspirator
exception, and the co-conspirator exception can be used even though the
indictment does not charge a conspiracy and even if the declarations
sought to be introduced are declarations of co-conspirators who are not
defendants in the case on trial.
52
A number of antitrust actions have considered the applicability of
these principles to civil cases. The leading case is Flintkote Co. v.
Lysfjord,153 which contains an excellent discussion of the law and of the
policy bases for excluding hearsay without an adequate foundation. The
following excerpt from Flintkote is, perhaps, the best analysis of the co-
conspirator exception that has ever been written:
We start with the major premise that all statements [by the conspirators]
were hearsay. In fact, when Waldron or Lysfjord told the jury what Ragland
said Krause had told him, we have hearsay placed upon hearsay; and when
1978), held that FED. R. EVID. 104 (a), not 104(b), governs the admissibility of a co-conspirator's
statements. See also United States v. Vinson, 606 F.2d 149, 153 (6th Cir. 1979).
148. This requirement has been phrased in various ways. United States v. Spanos, 462 F.2d 1012,
1014 (9th Cir. 1972), held that there must be "substantial independent evidence of the conspiracy
charged" before the testimony may be admitted. See also United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683,701 n. 14
(1974) ("As a preliminary matter, there must be substantial, independent evidence of the conspiracy, at
least enough to take the question to the jury."). The traditional rule was that the person seeking
admission of the hearsay statement of a co-conspirator must make out a prima facie case of the
conspiracy and of the defendant's connection with it. United States v. Enright, 579 F.2d 980,983 (6th
Cir. 1978) (collecting cases). However, the First Circuit decided that the prima facie test was no longer
valid in light of FED. R. EVID. 104(a), see United States v. Petrozziello, 548 F.2d 20 (1 st Cir. 1977), and
held that the district court must find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that a conspiracy existed and
the defendant was connected with it. Petrozziello stated that "if it is more likely than not that the
deelarant and the defendant were members of a conspiracy when the hearsay statement was made, and
that the statement was in furtherance of the conspiracy, the hearsay is admissible." Id. at 23. The Court
of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adopted the Petrozziello standard in Enright, 579 F.2d at 986, and
recognized that its earlier statements of the prima facie rule should not to be followed. Id. at 983.
149. See, e.g., United States v. Harrell, 436 F.2d 606,613 (5th Cir. 1970),aff'dafterremnand,458
F.2d 655 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 846 (1972); Salazar v. United States, 405 F.2d 74 (9th Cir.
1968); United States v. Birnbaum, 337 F.2d 490, 494-95 (2d Cir. 1964).
150. See, e.g., Dutton v. Evans, 400 U.S. 74,81(1970); Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471,
490-91 (1963); United States v. Mitchell, 556 F.2d 371, 377 n.6 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 925
(1977); Kay v. United States, 421 F.2d 1007, 1010 (9th Cir. 1970).
151. United States v. Mitchell, 556 F.2d 371,377 n.6 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 925(1977).
152. United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 701 (1974).
153. 246 F.2d 368, 382-87 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835 (1957).
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the plaintiffs testified that Ragland told them what Krause or Newport or
Howard had said at a meeting, concerning which there had been no proper
foundation laid as to whether Ragland was present, we have hearsay placed
upon hearsay placed upon hearsay.
It is true that there are so many exceptions to the hearsay rule that much
of the evidence which decides law suits is made up of hearsay evidence. But
this does not eliminate the hearsay rule as a vital and important rule of
evidence, nor permit us, or the lower court, to open wide the floodgates to any
evidence, in total disregard of the rule.
One of the very best reasons for the hearsay objection is to prevent the
presentation of self-serving statements. The instant case is a perfect example
of the reason and of the necessity for the rule. Without in any way passing
upon or inferring as to the credibility of witnesses who testified, we here have
two of the three most interested parties to the law suit ascribing vital
culpatory statements to Krause; to Newport; to Howard; to Baymiller; to
Thompson; to Lewis and to Ragland, each one of whom (except Newport
who did not testify) denies both any recollection of the specific alleged
statements, and of the fact sought to be proved by the hearsay statement.
But the hearsay rule serves another more important purpose. It requires
the person asserting a fact to be present in the courtroom, and to subject
himself to the best method yet devised for a determination of the truth of a
fact; cross-examination.
5 4
The court stated that evidence of this type could only be offered under one
of the exceptions to the hearsay rule:
A number of theories exist under which the alleged statements of Ragland
might have been offered against the defendant Flintkote, as exceptions to the
hearsay rule: (1) As an admission of a party's authorized agent; (2) as a
statement of a co-conspirator; (3) as a statement made as part of the res
gestae.155
The court then held that the plaintiffs had not offered sufficient proof to
make the statements admissible under any of these exceptions, 1 6 and that
the evidence was obviously prejudicial to the jury:
What was the effect of the erroneous admission of this evidence?
Here we have testimony introduced which goes to the very heart of
plaintiff's cause of action and to defendant's defense. Why did Flintkote
terminate the contract? No reason was placed in writing. The only evidence
(other than the bare refusal to sell, which was equivocal) were the
conversations. Of these a reading of the record persuasively demonstrates
that Ragland's alleged statements were by far the most significant and the
most damaging to defendant's cause. They spelled out in clear perspective the
nature of the conspiracy and brought the events home to the jury with the
dramatic and incisive impact that only admissions can produce. This was
defendant's own former employee outlining the unlawful scheme. The full
effect of this evidence on thejurors' minds cannot be measured with precision.
To deny that it influenced the jury's verdict in a material manner is to ignore
reality. 17
154. 246 F.2d at 382-83 (footnotes omitted).
155. IM. at 383.
156. Id. at 383, 385.
157. k. at 386.
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The court stated that the analysis under the co-conspirator's
exception was "one of the law of agency, not of the law of evidence."' 58 The
question of agency law is the question whether the admissions were made
by the agent within the scope of his authority, and an analysis of the
person's position and agency relationship should properly be undertaken
by the trial court as a predicate or foundation for the admissibility of the
co-conspirator's statements.
59
These lengthy quotations from Flintkote show the problems and the
type of analyses a trial court must undertake when confronted with a
request for admission of hearsay evidence. Indeed, the Flintkote court
recognized the necessity of a thorough consideration of these issues when it
stated that "the court was pressed for immediate answers on involved
procedural and evidentiary points.' 160 This is always the situation in a
conspiracy action under the federal antitrust or securities laws when a
request for admission of co-conspirators' statements is made. The court
should, therefore, have the benefit of a written motion by the party who
seeks to exclude the statements. Without such a motion, the party affected
by the statements may simply go to the gallows arguing about the width of
the rope that hanged him.
Another situation in which a written motion to exclude evidence
should be made is illustrated by South-East Coal Co. v. Consolidated Coal
Co.,' 6' in which the court held that there was no error in the introduction of
parts of the defendant's answers to written interrogatories and exerpts
from speeches and other statements made by union officials that were
attached to the interrogatories:
The general rule is that this type of evidence is admissible, however, subject to
exclusion if no prima facie case of the existence of the conspiracy is
established. The question of conditional admissibility is for the trial judge to
determine. Carbo v. United States, 314 F.2d 718 (9th Cir. 1963). There is no
error in conditionally admitting the statements before a prima facie case was
established by independent evidence if subsequently such a case is proven,
because the trial judge has wide discretion over the order of proof.
Pennington v. United Mine Workers of America, 325 F.2d 804, 817 (6th Cir.
1963), reversed on other grounds, 381 U.S. 657,85 S.Ct. 1585, 14 L.Ed.2d 626
(1965). Flintkote Company v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 378 (9th Cir. 1957),
cert. denied, 355 U.S. 835, 78 S.Ct. 54,2 L.Ed.2d 46. At the close of plaintiff's
case there had been established by independent or disassociated evidence a
prima facie case, thus the requirement for having conditionally admitted the
statement was met.
162
Conditional admissibility is not a good practice; once the hearsay
158. Id. at 384.
159. Id at 384-85. This is the type question that is properly analyzed under FED. R. EVID. 104(a).
See text following note 124 supra.
160. 246 F.2d at 385.
161. 434 F.2d 767, 779 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 402 U.S. 983 (1971).
162. 434 F.2d at 788. See also United States v. Mitchell, 556 F.2d 371,377 (6th Cir. 1977), which
reaches the same conclusion. But see the Sixth Circuit's decision in note 148 supra.
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statements are admitted and the jury has heard them, a simple instruction
by the court to ignore them, given at a later time in what may be a lengthy
trial, will not erase them from the jury's mind and may serve to highlight
them by calling to the jury's attention the very statements that it is told to
ignore. It is much better to ask the judge to consider the issue before trial by
filing a written pretrial motion, forcing the opponent to substantiate his
assertion that a conspiracy will be proven, and thereby preventing the
conditional admission of statements that, more likely than not, would have
been admitted had the issue first been raised through an oral objection at
trial. As the Third Circuit noted in Baughman v. Cooper-Jarret, Inc., 63
an action in which hearsay was found to be admissible against one de-
fendant but not others "the preferred course [is] to give a limiting
instruction that [the defendant's] statements [are] not admissible to show
the participation of [other defendants] in the conspiracy."' 64 A limiting
instruction of this sort is exactly the type of relief that can be obtained by a
written pretrial motion with an attached deposition transcript of the
damaging statements sought to be limited or excluded.
A party should also remember that the use of written motions can
prevent the dilemma presented by cases like Coughlin v. Capitol Cement
Co.,' 65 in which the court of appeals found error in the admission of certain
hearsay evidence but affirmed since, in its opinion, the error was
nonprejudicial. 66 Counsel has a better chance of having the evidence
excluded if a written pretrial motion is used. Once the evidence is admitted,
however, no one can tell what effect it might have had on the minds of the
jurors, and appellate courts are apt to uphold a judgment by finding that
the wrongfully admitted evidence caused no harm.
In summary, these cases illustrate the desirability of using a pretrial
motion to exclude hearsay declarations. It is, of course, possible to argue
that a party's failure to prove the condition necessary for admission of
particular evidence was so prejudicial that a mistrial should be granted, 67
but this tactic should be reserved as a last ditch effort.'68 Failure to make a
written motion for exclusion of hearsay evidence may well result in the
entry of a judgment that is supported by nothing more than "back-fence
gossip."
Consent Decrees. Another type of evidence that may have serious
163. 530 F.2d 529 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 825 (1976).
164. Id. at 533.
165. [1978-1] Trade Cas. 61,957 (5th Cir. 1978).
166. "The improper admission of hearsay testimony which is merely cumulative on matters
shown by other admissible evidence is harmless error." Id. at 74,059.
167. "Cautionary instructions to the jury might not suffice to cure the resulting prejudice to the
defendant. In such instances it may be necessary for the trial judge to grant a defendant's request for a
mistrial." United States v. Continental Group, Inc., 603 F.2d 444, 456 (3d Cir. 1979) (citation omitted).
168. The likelihood of a court granting the extreme remedy ofa mistrial is, as a practical matter,
slim. Only the clearest examples of irreconcilable prejudice are likely to be dealt with in this fashion,
particularly if the motion comes at the end of a lengthy trial, as is apt to be the case in complex civil
actions.
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adverse effects if introduced in ajury action is evidence concerning consent
decrees or alleged violations of consent decrees or similar agreements
reached with a governmental agency. When a plaintiff includes such
evidence in its list of trial exhibits, a motion to strike the exhibit and to
exclude all evidence of the consent decree should immediately be filed.
Control Data Corp. v. International Business Machine Corp. 69 is an
excellent example of this practice. In that case defendant moved to strike
all references to two prior decrees entered against the defendant from the
pleadings and also to prevent plaintiff's counsel from mentioning the
decrees during the trial or introducing them into evidence. The court
granted the motion, stating that consent decrees under section 5 of the
Clayton Act, 70 like recitals of nolo contendere pleas entered in previous
criminal cases, were not relevant:
There are a number of decided cases striking from a complaint in a treble
damage action brought under the Clayton Act recitals of nolo contendere
pleas entered in previous criminal cases. The holdings are quite uniform that
such allegations must be stricken. It is said that these pleas are the equivalent
of consent decrees under Section 5(a) of the Clayton Act, 15 U.S.C. § 16(a).
It follows that a consent judgment whether it be in a civil case or a nolo
plea in a criminal case, or any evidence thereof, is not admissible in a treble
damage action and can have no real purpose except to attempt to prejudice a
defendant before a jury. The issue is whether IBM, within the period of the
applicable statute of limitations, has violated the antitrust laws, not whether
it previously has been found guilty thereof (1935 decree) or has consented to a
decree (1956). It can in truth be stated that at a trial before ajury, reference to
a prior decree is for practical purposes nearly the equivalent of the prima facie
evidence rule so far as informing the jury that IBM has previously been in
trouble with the government,' 7'
The court struck all references to the consent decree from the complaint,
dismissed that part of the action that was premised upon a violation of the
prior consent decree, and ordered that the consent decrees "not be
admitted in evidence at trial."'
72
Control Data and similar cases are based on the principle that the
United States alone speaks for the public interest, and that since the public
interest is affected when a consent decree is violated, only the United States
can bring an action alleging violation of a consent decree.'73 The result is
169. 306 F. Supp. 839 (D. Minn. 1969), aff'd per curlam, 430 F.2d 1277 (8th Cir. 1970).
170. 15 U.S.C. § 16(a) (1976).
171. 306 F. Supp. at 844 (citations omitted).
172. 306 F. Supp. at 849.
173. Buckeye Coal & Ry. Co. v. Hocking Valley Ry. Co., 269 U.S. 42,48-49 (1925). The Second
Circuit has stated that a consent decree is comparable to an order of the National Labor Relations
Board since the complaining party cannot enforce the order which is entered against the defendant.
United States v. ASCAP, 341 F.2d 1003, 1008 (2d Cir. 1965). In the court's language:
[T]he government is the sole proper party to seek enforcement of government antitrust
decrees. . . . [T]he fact that the court retains jurisdiction [in order to modify a decree] in an
antitrust action does not mean, unless the decree should expressly provide otherwise, that
persons affected by the judgment, but not parties to it, can invoke the court's jurisdiction to
alter or enforce the terms of the decree.
Id. See also Fuller v. Branch County Rd. Comm'n, 520 F.2d 307, 309 (6th Cir. 1975).
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that a plaintiff's claim must rest upon an independent violation of the
antitrust laws, not on a consent decree or the violation of a consent
decree. 174
In arguing for the exclusion of consent decrees or similar orders,
counsel may rely on the various Federal Rules of Evidence relating to
relevance and admissibility of evidence of prior conduct. 75 In addition,
counsel would be well-advised to cite Greyhound Computer Corp. v.
176International Business Machines Corp., a case in which the court held
that a trial judge has discretion to exclude all references to a consent
decree. But above all, counsel should remember that a well-prepared case
may be effectively destroyed by even a moderately skilled cross-examiner
armed with a consent decree.
Changes in the Design of Products. Motions to exclude evidence of
changes in a product's design or changes in the "state of the art" which are
offered to show that an item is defective are inadmissible in an action based
upon strict liability in tort,177 and evidence of any such change would be
sufficiently prejudicial to warrant a pretrial exclusionary motion.
Scientific Evidence. A motion should be made to exclude any highly
technical or sophisticated scientific evidence unless (1) it is properly
authenticated and its trustworthiness is shown and (2) the party offering it
makes sufficient materials available to the opposing party to permit cross-
examination. These materials would include several items which the
motion should set forth with specificity. 17' First, the backup or source data
for the test or evidence being offered should be provided well in advance of
trial. 79 Second, a deposition of the witness who prepared the evidence or
conducted the test or procedure, and a deposition of the witness who is to
present the evidence at trial (if those two witnesses are different) should be
requested. Finally, the party should ask for all evidence of (1) the
preparation for the test, (2) test results from trials that were run before or
after the tests that are to be offered in evidence, and (3) any work
preliminary or preparatory to the tests or procedures.'"0
174. Independent Theatres, Inc. v. American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 179 F.
Supp. 489, 490 (S.D.N.Y. 1959); Brownlee v. Malco Theatres, Inc., 99 F. Supp. 312,317 (W.D. Ark.
1951).
175. Rule 403 provides that relevant evidence may be excluded if "its probative value is
substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice," and Rule 404(b) provides that "[e]vidence
of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
that he acted in conformity therewith."
176. [1977-2] Trade Cas. 61,603 (9th Cir. 1977).
177. See LaMonica v. Outboard Marine Corp., 48 Ohio App. 2d 43,44,355 N.E.2d 533 (1976),
and cases cited therein; Lolie v. Ohio Brass Co., 502 F.2d 741,744 (7th Cir. 1974). [Eds. note: But see
Note, Chart v. General Motors: Did It Chart the Way for the Admission of Evidence of Subsequent
Remedial Measures in Products Liability Actions?, 41 OHIO ST. L.J. 211 (1980).]
178. A motion of this type could be supported by cases such as United States v. Stifel, 433 F.2d
431 (6th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 994 (1971) (if the government uses highly sophisticated
scientilic evidence, neutron activation analysis, it must allow time for the defendant to make similar
tests).
179. I MOORE's FEDERAL PRACTICE, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION pt. 2, 2.71, at 129-32
(2d ed. 1979).
180. See Pearl Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schlitz Brewing Co., 415 F. Supp. 1122, 1134 (S.D. Tex.
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It is not possible to assemble an exhaustive list of the motions that
would be suited for excluding or limiting the use of evidence of this type.
However, any list would certainly include motions to exclude evidence of
subsequent remedial measures offered to prove negligence or culpable
conduct; 181 to conduct a hearing out of the jury's presence in order to
determine if the contents of a chart or summary is adequately supported by
the proof;'1 2 a motion to exclude tape recordings"' that contain a party's
conversation before the litigation and are likely to be given unjustified
weight by the jury; 84 or a motion to exclude computer evidence that is not
supported by the necessary foundation'85 or authentication.
18 6
1976) (permitting discovery of computer and economic experts' highly technical developmental work
for "a highly sophisticated and computerized econometric model," that was to be used to simulate
market conditions).
181. FED. R. EvID. 407; Annot., 64 A.L.R.2d 1296 (1959).
182. In United States v. Bartone, 400 F.2d 459, 461 (6th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1027
(1969), the Sixth Circuit encouraged trial courts to-conduct hearings out of thejury's presence "in order
to determine that everything contained in the summary is supported by the proof." More recently, in
United States v. Collins, 596 F.2d 166, 169 (6th Cir. 1979), the court stated that "such proceedings are
not invariably required, especially when, as in this case, the summaries are straightforward and their
basis in the evidence clear." Since well-prepared charts can give a deceptive appearance of
completeness, a short hearing out of the jury's presence, at which the opposing counsel cross-examines
or voir dires the person (usually an expert) who prepared the chart, would often be appropriate and
would not cause a serious loss of judicial time.
183. Numerous cases have considered the necessary foundation for introduction of electronic
recordings. See United States v. Starks, 515 F.2d 112, 121 n.l1 (3d Cir. 1975); United States v.
McMillan, 508 F.2d 101, 104 (8th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 916 (1975); United States v.
Skillman, 442 F.2d 542, 552 n.8 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 833 (197 1); United Statesv. Lipowski,
423 F. Supp. 864, 868 (D.N.J. 1976); State v. James, 41 Ohio App. 2d 248, 250, 325 N.E.2d 267,269
(1974) ("A mechanical record, if audible or legible, and not tampered with, is likely to be much more
accurate and dependable than oral testimony."). Various precautions, such as examination by an
expert to see that the tape has not been altered and providing the jury with a written transcript of the
conversation approved by both parties, can reduce the likelihood of error. A motion to exclude tape
recordings unless these precautions are taken should result in the court ordering the precautions and
giving the jury a cautionary instruction.
184. See United States v. Haldeman, 559 F.2d 31,54 n. 15 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S.
933 (1977), which prescribed the manner of handling excerpts of taped conversations for ajury. In that
case tape recordings of conversations of co-conspirators were not admitted into evidence, but the
transcripts were carefully checked by the trial judge and, once he ruled they were
"substantially accurate," they were then given to the jury to serve as listening aids while the
jury heard the tapes through head phones. The transcripts themselves were not admitted into
evidence, and the jury was repeatedly told that their own interpretation of what they heard on
the tapes was to control.
See also United States v. Gorel, 602 F.2d 734, 739 (5th Cir. 1979); United States v. Vinson, 606 F.2d
149, 155 (6th Cir. 1979); United States v. Nickerson, 606 F.2d 156, 158 (6th Cir. 1979).
185. The required foundation usually consists of a showing by the person offering the computer
evidence that (1) the entries were made in the ordinary course of business, or were made from "hard
copy" records which themselves were made in the ordinary course of business; (2) the machine or
equipment is accurate; (3) those who supply the information or run the machine or equipment were
trained so that the information put into the machine or equipment was accurate; and (4) certain
precautions were taken to prevent errors. See the excellent concurring opinion of Judge Ely in United
States v. de Georgia, 420 F.2d 889, 894 (9th Cir. 1969), a case which held that testimony that an
automobile rental company's computer showed that no transaction involving the allegedly stolen
automobile had been recorded at the relevant times as admissible under the Federal Business Records
Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1732. See also Schiavone-Chase Corp. v. United States, 553 F.2d 658, 666 (Ct. Cl.
1977) (affirming the trial court's admission of a party's "computer billing lists contained in its own
books and records," based on testimony "that these computer billing lists were prepared from original
'hard copy' documents," even though the hard copy documents had been destroyed); United States v.
Liebert, 519 F.2d 542,547-48 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 985 (1975) (dealing with Internal Revenue
COMPLEX LITIGATION
Admissibility of surveys or polls may be challenged both under the
hearsay rule and because the survey or poll contains leading questions,
contains self-serving statements, or was prepared with poor techniques.I87
The Manual for Complex Litigation states that "it is desirable that
questions going to the admissibility of the polls or samples be raised and, if
possible, decided prior to the time they are offered in evidence.' ' 8
A good outline of the procedure for attacking survey evidence on non-
hearsay grounds is provided in Ways & Means, Inc. v. IVAC Corp.'89 In
that case the court denied the plaintiff's motion for a pretrial ruling on the
admissibility of a damage study, focusing on Federal Rule of Evidence 703:
The modern trend appears to be to examine the admissibility of survey
Service printouts indicating that the IRS had no record of having received the defendant's federal
income tax returns); United States v. Russo, 480 F.2d 1228,1241 (6th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
1157 (1974) (computer printout of insurance company's annual statistical run held properly admitted);
United States v. Dioguardi, 428 F.2d 1033, 1037-39 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 825 (1970)
(concerning a computer program by which a prosecution witness had instructed a computer to prepare
figures showing when various items of a bankrupt's inventory were exhausted, and holding that
effective cross-examination of such a witness requires that the prosecution make available before trial
materials needed for cross-examination such as computer programs and the flow charts used in
preparation of computer programs); Ed Guth Realty, Inc. v. Gingold, 34 N.Y.2d 440, 358 N.Y.S.2d
367, 315 N.E.2d 441 (1974) (holding that statistical evidence backing up real property equalization
rates stored as computer printouts could be introduced in evidence under the business entry rule and
also under the voluminous writings exception to the best evidence rule). See generally Annot., 71
A.L.R.3d 232 (1976); Annot., II A.L.R.3d 1377 (1967); Note, A Reconsideration of the Admissibility
of Computer-Generated Evidence, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 425 (1977); Note, Appropriate Foundation
Requirements for Admitting Computer Printouts Into Evidence, 1977 WASH. U.L.Q. 59; Younger,
Computer Printouts in Evidence: Ten Objections and How to Overcome Them, 2 LITIGATION 28
(1975); Roberts, A Practitioner's Primer on Computer-Generated Evidence, 41 U. CHI. L. REv. 254
(1974).
186. FED. R. EvID. 901, 902 can be of considerable help in authenticating documents without
detailed foundation testimony at trial. FED. R. EvID. 901(b)(7) provides that public records or reports
can be authenticated by evidence that the report "or data compilation, in anyform, is from the public
office where items of this nature are kept (emphasis added)." Computer evidence can also be
authenticated under FED. R. EvID. 901(b)(9), dealing with authentication of a process or system:
"Evidence describing a process or system used to produce a result and showing that the process or
system produces an accurate result." In addition, public records that are also data compilations can be
authenticated under FED. R. EvID. 902(4) which provides that certified copies of public records,
including "data compilations in any form," are self-authenticating. Numerous types of summaries kept
by governmental agencies may therefore be authenticated by presenting them with a seal or
certification.
Judicial notice under FED. R. EvID. 201 is another quick way to avoid consumption of trial time
with these matters, and the party offering scientific or technical evidence may well wish to file a written
motion asking the court to take judicial notice of the relevant facts underlying the testimony or
evidence and the accuracy of the equipment or procedure involved. As to judicial notice in complex
cases, see Ames, Evidentiary Aspects of Relevant Product Market Proof in Monopolization Cases, 26
DL PAUL L. REV. 530, 544 n.67 (1977).
187. See, e.g., Pittsburgh Press Club v. United States, 579 F.2d 751, 759 n.16 (3d Cir. 1978),
reversing and remanding an income tax refund action in which a survey of affairs of a previously tax-
exempt press club was held to be inadmissible hearsay. The survey at issue in Pittsburgh Press Club was
not objective, scientific, or impartial. The court held that the district court's findings, which were all
premised on the inadmissible survey, were not supported by the record and were thus clearly erroneous.
This case contains a good collection of the authorities concerning the admissibility of survey and poll
evidence. See also Randy's Studebaker Sales, Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 533 F.2d 510, 519-20 (10th
Cir. 1976) (upholding admission of questionnaires completed by customers of an automobile dealer
after the litigation began).
188. I MOORE'S FEDERAL PRACTICE, MANUAL FOR COMPLEX LITIGATION pt. 2, 2.71, at 127 (2d
ed. 1979). See also id. 3.50.
189. [1979-2] Trade Cas. 62,734 (N.D. Calif. 1979).
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evidence without regard to traditional hearsay analysis, relying instead upon
the two principal factors suggested by Rule 703: (1) whether or not there is
some necessity that makes the survey desirable; and (2) whether or not the
survey itself is trustworthy. 90
As a general rule, counsel should move to exclude any evidence that
creates "the delusive impression of exactness in an area where a jury's
common sense is less available than usual to protect it."' 9 ' Depositions of
an opponent's experts and examination of an opponent's trial exhibits
should quickly reveal such evidence.
B. Procedures for Instructing the Jury
How should counsel educate the jury to his case? There is an
increasing tendency for courts to permit jurors to participate in the trial
proceedings to follow more closely and to understand the evidence. Jurors
can take copies of the jury instructions and the exhibits into the jury room
during deliberations, 92 take notes,193 ask questions, and hold personal
copies of exhibits during questioning of each witness. A short motion can
be filed asking the court to permit any of these steps.
Another method for a juror to follow and understand the evidence is
to see the subject of the action or the site of the events leading to the action.
A motion for an order permitting the jury or the court 194 to view the subject
or scene of the action or some other place has several advantages in
complex civil actions. First, it permits the jury to obtain a better
understanding of the case.' 95 Second, it can enliven the presentation of a
commercial case that otherwise involves proof that is dull or technical.
Third, it can be used to deal a deadly blow to certain types of claims or
190. Id. at 78,143 (emphasis in original).
191. Herman Schwabe, Inc. v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 297 F.2d 906, 912 (2d Cir. 1962).
192. "It is frequently desirable that instructions which have been reduced to writing be not only
read to the jury, but also handed to the jury." McDaniel v. United States, 343 F.2d 785,789 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 382 U.S. 826 (1965). Giving a written copy of the instructions to the jury is not error.
Haupt v. United States, 330 U.S. 631, 643 (1947) (allowing jury to have a typewritten copy of charge
was not error); United States v. Blane, 375 F.2d 249,255 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 835 (1967). In
contrast to the jury instructions, the pleadings are not to be provided to the jury. McGowan v.
Gillenwater, 429 F.2d 586, 587 (4th Cir. 1970).
193. United States v. Johnson, 584 F.2d 148, 157-158 (6th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 99 S. Ct. 1239
(1979); Note, Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 981 n.453
(1959).
194. A view by a judge is quicker, logistically simpler, and probably more beneficial to the
trier of fact (since a judge can ask questions) than a view by a jury. For the benefits of such a view in a
complex case, see the description of the trial judge's visit to a packaging show in the case of United
States v. E. I. Du Pont De Nemours & Co., 351 U.S. 377 (1956), a famous antitrust case in which the
issue was whether flexible wrapping materials should be included with cellophane in the relevant
product market, reprinted in Ames, Evidentiary Aspects of Relevant Product Market Proof in
Monopolization Cases, 26 DE PAUL L. REV. 530, 546 (1977).
195. In W. M. & A. Transit Co. v. Radecka, 302 F.2d 921, 925 (D.C. Cir. 1962), the jurors
literally put themselves in the plaintiff's position. Radecka was an action by a bus passenger against a
bus company for injuries sustained when the plaintiff passenger was thrown from a seat when the bus
suddenly stopped. The court held that the trial court properly permitted the jury to examine the bus
and "sit in the seat [in which the plaintiff passenger had sat] and formulate their own conclusions."
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defenses, such as the defense that it was easy for the plaintiff to inspect, test,
or check the equipment or goods or facility purchased under the contract.
A view may also be relevant to damages.
196
Several points should be made when requesting a view. The trial judge
will want to know 97 and should be told (1) what information the view will
provide, and especially what information cannot be provided by other
proof in the case; (2) the location of the subject or premises to be viewed
and its distance from the courtroom; (3) the expense, time, and method of
transportation entailed in the view;198 (4) whether the conditions or the
premises or subject have significantly changed or have been materially
altered since the events giving rise to the litigation; 9 9 and (5) what the jury
should be told about the view and its purpose.0 0
The jury should be told about the purpose of the view and how it is to
be conducted. A suggested instruction should be included in the written
memorandum in support of the motion, so opposing counsel will have a
chance to review it and discuss it with the court. The trial judge will then
feel more confident in giving the instruction to the jury and conducting the
view.
Although the view is traditionally conducted very early in a case, it is
the better practice to delay the view until at least some of the witnesses have
testified. Jurors learn and retain less through an early view201 since an early
196. A view of a construction site was approved in Leo Spear Construction Co. v. Fidelity &
Cas. Co. of New York, 446 F.2d 439, 444 (2d Cir. 197 1), an action by a subcontractor against a general
contractor's surety in which the general contractor had allegedly defaulted. The court of appeals held
that the trial court's examination of the site of the work was proper, and that the court correctly
allowed "the inspection of the site to influence its determination of value" of labor and materials on the
job.
197. "The propriety of sending the jurors to view the property was a question that lay within the
sound discretion of the district judge." Gunther v. E.I. duPont de Nemours & Co., 255 F.2d 710,716
(4th Cir. 1958). Accord, Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. Global Moving& Storage, Inc., 533 F.2d 320,
323 (6th Cir. 1976).
198. The motion should state that the moving party has arranged a bus from the ABC Transit
Company to take the court, jury, and counsel to the scene and return them to the courtroom. The
motion is more likely to be granted if the trial judge does not have to concern himself with the logistics
of the view.
199. Martin v. Gulf States Utils. Co., 344 F.2d 34,37 (5th Cir. 1965), held that there was no error
in permitting a jury to view the scene of an accident that ocurred when an apprentice electrician
attempted to move an uninsulated service cable attached to the defendant's utility pole, even though the
appearance of the scene had been substantially altered since the accident by the trimming of trees.
Accord, Northwestern Nat'l Cas. Co. v. Global Moving & Storage, Inc., 533 F.2d 320, 323 (6th Cir.
1976).
200. Along with the authority for the view, the court will be assisted by a proposed cautionary
instruction to be given to the jury before the view. An example of such an instruction is reproduced in
Culpepper v. Neff, 204 Va. 800,804-06, 134 S.E.2d 315,318-20 (1964), and in Virginia Jury Instructions
§ 7.06 (Supp. 1979).
201. In Lynchburg Foundry Co. v. Daniel Int'l Corp., No. 76-0046 (L) (W.D. Va. May4, 1976),
a breach of contract action, the author requested and received a jury view of a foundry where a
complicated conveyor system (the underlying product) had collapsed. The view was conducted
immediately after opening statements, before any testimony was presented. After the trial was
completed, the jurors stated, without exception, that the view would have been much more helpful
if it had been conducted later in the trial, since they would have then known which details were
important and how the installation and operation of the conveyor related to the case.
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view requires the jurors to see the premises or subject before they
understand the issues in the case, the relevance or importance of the scene
to be viewed, the details to which attention should be paid, or the
significance that the premises or subject has for the witnesses' testimony. A
view should, therefore, be held after the jurors have the benefit not only of
opening statements, but also of at least some of the witnesses' testimony
that discloses the importance of the subject of the view.
A view can be even more beneficial if the court permits jurors to ask
questions during the view and allows the important areas or subjects to be
pointed out during the view. However, strict precautions should be taken
to prevent any improper comments or actions during the process. Jurors
should be allowed to direct their questions only to the trial judge, who then
confers with counsel concerning answer to be given. In addition, the
questions, conference of court and counsel, and answers should be
recorded by a court reporter who is present at the view. Finally, the jurors
should be told that the parties' proof may differ with respect to the
occurrence or sequence of events, and that the better questions are the
"what is that" and "where is this" questions, and not the "what happened"
or "who did this" questions.
III. CONCLUSION
The timely filing of written motions before trial and during the first
few days of a lengthy trial can do a great deal to structure a complex action
in a way that is advantageous to one's client. By carefully analyzing the
issues raised in the pleadings, the controlling law,20 2 and the nature and
order of proof that is likely to be followed, counsel will usually be able to
identify areas in which written motions can be utilized to narrow or
eliminate an unfavorable part of the opponent's case or highlight a
favorable portion of his own. Skillful use of written motions will ensure
that the advocate will be trying the case that is most advantageous to his
client when he rises to present his opening argument on the first day of trial.
202. Authority for the various motions that are suggested by this Article may be found in the
Manual for Complex Litigation, the Federal Rules of Evidence and the Advisory Committee's
accompanying notes, the Commerce Clearing House Antitrust and Securities Law Reporters,
computerized legal research services, and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Another, more recent
publication that may be useful in the ABA ANTITRUST SECTION'S MONOGRAPH No. 3, EXPEDITING
PRETRIALS AND TRIALS OF ANTITRUST CASES (1979). There is also law journal literature that contains
ideas for pretrial and trial strategies and methods. See notes 1, 33, 75 supra.
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